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Iraq's New War

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ABSTRACT: *There is metal contamination in Iraq in the soil around areas of heavy fighting, such as in the city of Fallujah, and there are reports of a wide range of congenital malformations and a shockingly high infant mortality rate. Some deem it unclear and whether these phenomena can be linked to the metal contamination. For example, many point to other known environmental and internal factors that can lead to birth defects, especially in Middle Eastern countries. However, such explanations cannot account for the high increase of birth defects, variances among cases, and the change in the sex ratio. Because of this, researchers name depleted uranium as the cause for the anomalies found in Fallujah. The radioactive nature of the metal, the widespread use of depleted uranium in Fallujah in 2004, and the metal's lasting effects support this conclusion. Government officials continue to deny the link between birth defects and the use of depleted uranium while others call for government action and seek innovative solutions.*

As Americans celebrated the end of the war in Iraq, many Iraqis were bracing for a new battle. In the last decade, physicians and residents of southern Iraqi villages witnessed an alarming phenomenon: there has been a large increase in congenital malformations. This leaves many to wonder what has happened in Iraq, how serious the situation is, and what could possibly be the cause. The literature and research suggests that the use of weapons by the United States in southern Iraq created a multitude of health problems due to the uranium that infiltrated the people's environment.

In 2004, the United States led an invasion into Fallujah in which the Iraqi city was bombarded twice with ammunition. According to Vlahos (2011), people in the area describe the city as being "practically obliterated" (p. 6) after the invasion. This depiction is supported in a study by the *American Conservative* reporting that "more than half of its 39,000 homes were damaged in Operation Phantom Fury" (Larison, 2010, p. 5). Given all of this destruction, Al-Sabback et al. (2012) point to research by Jergović to determine if a connection exists between the health problems and the ravaged state of Fallujah. In a collection of research evaluating war areas, Jergović, having analyzed regions for remnants of metals after fighting, "found significantly higher levels of metals in populations from areas with heavy fighting" (Al-Sabback et al., 2012, p. 938). Fallujah is the epitome of such a region, and now it stands to reason that metal contamination is a reality. The same article by the *American Conservative* reports congenital malformations in the region with 15 times the normal rate of birth defects (Larison, 2010). In consideration of these alarming data, Al-Sabback et al. (2012)

use a deductive approach to question whether the metal contamination from the heavy fighting is the cause of the unnatural increase in congenital malformations. Cognizant that irregularities and the presence of anomalies in any given environment can be potentially harmful to an individual, that exposure to pollutants can severely harm pregnant women, and that in cities with fighting, "severe contamination of water, soil, and air can occur" (Al-Sabback et al., 2012, p. 937), the authors contend that the increase in birth defects might be caused by metal contamination. Through a study evaluating hair, toenail, and teeth samples, 56 families participated in order for the researchers to evaluate if parents and children with the defects had been exposed to metals present in the ammunition and bombs used in the area. Mercury and lead are widely used in American weaponry, and the hair samples collected from Fallujah revealed lead "to be five times higher in the hair samples of children with birth defects than in the hair of normal children. . . . Mercury was six times higher" (Al-Sabback et al., 2012, p. 940). These results suggest a direct link between the metal contamination and the increase in birth defects.

As the research suggests, over the past few years, metal contamination has greatly influenced the Iraqi population and its children. The seriousness of the malformations, the great number of variances among cases, and how widespread the anomalies are amongst newborns is astonishing. Vlahos (2011) reports that "the litany of horrors is gut-wrenching" (p. 6) and describes a shocking list of malformations: "babies born with two heads, one eye in the middle of the face, missing limbs, too many limbs, brain damage, cardiac defects, abnor-

mally large heads, eyeless, missing genitalia, riddled with tumors” (p.6). The defects are depressing to hear about, even more so because they are so common. Vlahos (2011) continues, recounting a study by Fallujah General Hospital that in one month they “found that 15 percent of all 547 deliveries presented birth defects” (p.7) These numbers were similarly reflected in the previous four months. On top of the deformities, the study also reports “76 miscarriages, 60 premature deliveries, and one stillbirth” (Vlahos, 2011, p.7).

Not only are these children being born with deformities, but there has also been a considerably high infant mortality rate. An extensive study by a group of researchers found the mortality rate to be “80 [deaths] per 1000 live births in children” (Alaani, Al-Fallouji, Busby, & Hamdan, 2012, p.2). These distressing results are put into perspective when compared to other parts of the world. Alaani et al. (2012) compare the mortality rate in Fallujah to similar, near-by countries, finding “a figure of 17 in Jordan and 9 in Kuwait [per 1000 live births]” (p.2). Furthermore, Vlahos compares the high levels of deformities found to that of the United States and the worldwide average. The *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* reported that “since 2003 ‘congenital malformations’ were observed in 15 percent of all births in Fallujah in 2010. . . . By comparison, major birth defects affect only an estimated 3 percent of every live birth in the U.S. and an average of 6 percent of all births worldwide” (Vlahos, 2011, p.7).

Epidemic health problems have ravaged the city of Fallujah. Research shows that these numbers are consistent and growing. Dr. Ayman Qais, the director of Fallujah’s General Hospital, “told *The Guardian* that he was seeing two affected babies a day, compared to two a fortnight in 2008” (Vlahos, 2011, p.6). Perhaps the only thing more alarming than the fact that these problems are increasing is the proliferation of contaminated areas. Vlahos (2011) continues, referring to a study by an internal Iraqi ministry that found “40 sites in the country that are contaminated with high levels of radiation and dioxins” (p.7). These regions are heavily riddled with toxins because of the war that took place there.

While evidence indicating a strong link between metal contamination due to weaponry and the increase in birth defects has been uncovered, the possibility of other contributing factors in Iraq must be considered. Vlahos (2011) explains that “Iraq is a quick study in environmental malpractice” (p.7) due to the improper disposal of waste leading to the infiltration of the water supply. The various environmental contaminants have

the possibility of contributing to birth defects. A survey conducted by the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation along with the United Nations Development Programme in 2004 after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s reign in Iraq provided crucial information and insight into the conditions of the people. After an examination of 21,688 households, “electricity shortages, poor sewage systems and a lack of clean water were overriding issues . . .” (“Iraq,” 2005). The survey also found that “only 43 percent of those in rural areas had access to clean water compared to 66 percent in urban areas. . . . Nearly 63 percent of respondents were not connected to any sewage system, with those in rural areas being worse off.” These conditions have an impact on the health of parents, mothers, and developing children.

Poor living conditions can also lead to maternal stress. Research examining possible causes for the health problems in Iraq contends that “stress may exacerbate risk in [a] population with poor nutritional status and meager economic resources. A recent study in Iraq reported exposure of Iraqi pregnant women to a high level of stress during the last two decades” (Al-Hadithi, Al-Diwan, Saleh, & Shabila, 2012, p.5). The survey taken in Iraq in 2004 not only revealed poor living conditions, but also that nearly a quarter of children aged between six months and five years were malnourished (“Iraq: Living conditions,” 2005).

While external factors of environmental causation have been presented, others propose internal issues as part of explanation for the spike in birth defects: consanguinity. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), explains that consanguinity “increases the prevalence of rare genetic congenital anomalies and nearly doubles the risk for neonatal and childhood death, intellectual disability, and serious birth anomalies in first cousin unions” (“Congenital Anomalies,” 2012). Though consanguinity is a known cause of birth defects in general, this is not the only explanation for the birth defects in Iraq. Consanguinity is a common practice in many Middle Eastern countries. Yet if this were the reason for the spike in birth defects in culturally Iraq, the high increase in affected infants would be reflected in similar countries such as Kuwait and Jordan. However, these countries do not share the same high levels of deformities and infant mortality.

Additionally, all studies done in Iraq have taken consanguinity into account with several other factors named by the WHO as being potential causes of deformities listed as: “maternal exposure to pesticides, medicinal and recreational drugs, alcohol, tobacco, certain chemicals . . .” (“Congenital Anomalies,” 2012). In every re-

search study, information was obtained first to determine if a family would be suitable. In the study by Al-Sabback et al. (2011), “using a questionnaire, information on reproductive history of families and the parents’ siblings, residence history, health and disease during pregnancy, smoking and alcohol use, source of water for the family, and exposure to potential war contaminants was collected” (p.938). Also through a questionnaire, Alaani, Al-Fallouji, Busby, Hamdan, and Blaurock-Busch (2011) first “obtained the clinical details of the congenital anomaly, the age of the parents, their smoking history and alcohol drinking history and where they lived” (p.4). Therefore, families that had these health-adverse features were either excluded from the studies or knowledge of their past was taken into account when calculating results.

Environmental factors and actions taken by the parents are contributing factors to birth defects, but because of the seriousness of the malformations, the great variance among cases, and how widespread the anomalies are amongst the newborns, researchers conclude that the cause must be the extreme metal contamination. The situation in Iraq is becoming increasingly complex. Due to the various studies and reports concerning the congenital malformations, Alaani, et al. (2011) conducted their own experiment to determine the cause. Because depleted uranium (DU) is a product of many weapons, the authors started their research by examining the effects of DU which was used in Gulf War I. DU is a known potential cause of birth defects and cancer. Though there are variations in the studies, they found that the veterans of Gulf War I had children who showed an increased rate of congenital malformations. Also supporting the connection between the weapons and the defects is the increase of similar health issues in the Quirra polygon in Sicily where uranium weapons are tested.

Because of the increased rate of deformities in Gulf War I veterans’ children, the health issues in Sicily, and since it is the only known radioactive metal found in Iraq, the authors chose to focus on uranium as a possible cause for the problems. The researchers evaluated hair for uranium content. The results showed that parents of children with the anomalies possessed higher levels of uranium than that of what is normal for the area. They also examined long strands of hair and determined that at a certain length, one could find the level of uranium in the hair at the time of the attack. After doing so, it was clear that at the time of the heavy fighting and following it, the level of uranium excreted into the hair was abnormally high for the region and did not dissipate as would

be expected. The study proves uranium was in the weapons and is now contaminating the soil.

Moreover, because the anomalies are so widespread, and there has been a change in the sex ratio (“seen in the epidemiological study . . . an indicator of genetic stress” [Alaani et al., 2011, p. 2]), the nature of the health issues suggests a change in the genetics of the population. Uranium is the only element used in weaponry that is specifically known to be genotoxic; therefore, the negative health effects seen in Fallujah can be traced to uranium-based weapons not only because of the hair samples but also because it is the only explanation for the significant change in the sex ratio. Also supporting this finding was a study carried out by a group of researchers intending to evaluate the validity of previous epidemiological studies objectively. Over a period of 11 months beginning in November 2009, they researched the health problems at Fallujah General Hospital. The study reports that “. . . the genotoxic stress in Fallujah which led to the high cancer rates and sex ratio changes in the epidemiology study are supported here by the changes in the levels of congenital anomaly” (Alaani et al., 2012, p.6). They conclude that “some serious mutagenic exposure has affected and still affects the population of the town in 2010” (Alaani et al., 2012, p.6), and that future studies have been planned to investigate further.

With this strong evidence that uranium must be present in the soil, a focus is drawn to the innate qualities that uranium possesses. It is incontrovertible that depleted uranium is radioactive, and “the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has estimated that 1,000 to 2,000 metric tons of depleted uranium was fired during the 2003 war in Iraq” (Ludwig, 2013). In a recent study, researchers used a remote sensing technique to gauge the amount of radiation from uranium in twelve different sites across Iraq (Fathi, Matti, Al-Salih, & Godbol, 2013). The results revealed that “uranium in soils was determined at the different sites studied around Mosul city. A wide range of concentration of uranium was determined in the surface layer of soil” (Fathi et al., 2013, p. 19). This study extensively examines the radioactive nature of uranium and concludes that “contamination has spread widely in the air, soil and water, particularly as dust in windstorms” (Fathi et al., 2013, p.23). Peterson (2003) writes in the *Christian Science Monitor* about Latifa Khalaf Hamid’s produce stand that is “just four paces away from a burnt-out Iraqi tank, destroyed by – and contaminated with – controversial American depleted uranium bullets.” The radioactive dust lightly covers her produce and children

play on the radioactive debris, all completely unaware of the danger of their actions.

With all of these factors contributing to Iraq's health epidemic, what is the response? In 2011 Pentagon spokesman Michael Kilpatrick "told the BBC last year, 'no studies to date have indicated environmental issues resulting in specific health issues'" (Vlahos, 2011, p. 8). Another U.S. Defense Department spokesperson said, "We are not aware of any official reports indicating an increase in birth defects in Al Basrah or Fallujah that may be related to exposure to the metals contained in munitions used by the US or coalition partners" (Morrison, 2012, p. 2). From an objective stance, this may very well be true. Alborz (2013), writing on how to rebuild a post-war Iraq, notes that "regardless of the need for further investigation of the impact of potential sources of contamination on child health, there is a moral duty to remove such widespread likely threats to the well-being of future generations in affected localities" (p. 42). It is indisputable that DU was used and remains in the environment. The *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* conducted a study evaluating the toxicity of depleted uranium through multiple tests and remarked that "uranium persists in the environment for extended periods and military use of this material will likely continue" (Briner, 2010, p. 308). Knowing that the problems will persist, what does the research suggest concerning what could be done? If the studies conducted prove to be valid and the United States recognizes them, how would the remedy manifest?

A study on the relationship between depleted uranium and fungi found that "all tested fungi exhibited high DU tolerance and were able to colonize DU surfaces" (Fomina et al., 2008, p. R375). Once this relationship was established, "aerobic corrosion of DU was facilitated by the fungal biofilms, which retained moisture on DU

surfaces . . . DU-colonizing fungi were able to overgrow DU corrosion products" (Fomina et al., 2008, p. R376). The fungi actually began to corrode the samples of depleted uranium, and after a 3-month incubation period, a significant weight loss of the depleted uranium sample was reported. The fungi are able to retain the uranium immobilizing the metal (Fomina et al., 2008). The researchers reported:

we have shown for the first time that fungi can transform metallic uranium into meta-autunite minerals, which are capable of long-term uranium retention. . . . This phenomenon could be relevant to the future development of various remediation and revegetation techniques for uranium-polluted soils. (Fomina et al., 2008, p. R376)

Therefore, if depleted uranium is plaguing the environment in Iraq, namely Fallujah, studies are pursuing different avenues for remedy.

It is clear that metal contamination has taken place, leading to a horrific array of congenital malformations; though, it remains a controversial issue whether these reports are valid, and has led many to turn to other known factors. But with continual, compelling research that these congenital anomalies can be explained through contact with uranium from U.S. weaponry, the U.S. government and innovative researchers have begun to search for answers. One thing remains certain: Americans will continue to celebrate the end of the war in Iraq, while many Iraqis will face the new battle of combating the results.

KATHRYN ENGLISH is an undergraduate in political science.

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A Review of the Bureau of Prisons' Education Policy

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ABSTRACT: *The United States is the founder of the modern prison system and the most incarcerated nation in the world. Punishment has been the primary function of incarceration with little success preventing recidivism. The national recidivism rate has held steady at approximately 66%. However, educational programs that have already been implemented have shown significant potential for reducing recidivism. By making education and occupational training a priority, recidivism rates can be reduced more effectively than in prison systems focused solely or mostly on punishment. This essay reviews the current Federal Bureau of Prisons' policies regarding inmate education, examines problems of implementation, and makes suggestions to improve educational programs in correctional institutions.*

Two of the most significant goals of correctional institutions are facilitating reentry into society and reducing recidivism. The United States Bureau of Prisons has adopted three policies regarding education, literacy, and occupational training in an attempt to achieve such goals. While these educational programs have shown to be effective in reducing recidivism rates, there are substantial difficulties of implementation preventing the programs from achieving their maximum potential for success.

History

The modern understanding of prisons as a place to confine convicts for a specific duration of time as retribution for crimes was not established until the early 19th century. American philosopher Benjamin Rush devised the new form of punishment with the intention of expedient reformation. He argued that the United States had created the greatest governmental system, and it was going to “invent the most speedy and effectual method . . . of restoring the vicious part of mankind to virtue and happiness, and of extirpating a portion of vice from the world” (Perkinson, 2010, p.60) as well. People began to advocate for prisons as they are known today—large, imposing institutions of concrete or stone designed to rehabilitate offenders or house them indefinitely in the attempt to do so. In the early stages of development, two methods were created: the harsh New York model, which focused on punishing offenders with increasing degrees of severity until they began to conform to the behavioral standards of society, and the Pennsylvania model, established around the Quaker tradition, in which the goal

was to reform and rehabilitate offenders so they would become proper members of society.

These two methods sparked substantial debate that is still alive today over which would best serve the needs of communities. Now, the divisive issue revolves around whether rehabilitation costs more money than punishment. Across the United States, punishment quickly became the leading method for corrections. This was especially true in the South, where money for prisons was scarce and capital punishment was the preferred response to criminal behavior. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, prisons operated more like labor camps than government facilities. A prison sentence at the time essentially meant state-sanctioned slavery for the profit of the state, and the prisoners proved very profitable. Texas prisons at one time were the leading producers of cotton and textiles in the entire country, and inmates built Imperial Sugar through the prison contracts with private businesses for laborers. Prisoners sentenced in North Carolina were sent to railroad camps throughout the Appalachian region. Tennessee used inmates as coal miners, sold their urine to tanneries, and sold the bodies of deceased prisoners to medical institutions (Perkinson, 2010).

Punishment and profit were the main focuses of prisons across the nation. Over the years, numerous scholars have tried to change the system and have had some success with a few programs. However, rehabilitation has never been the priority of correctional institutions despite its effectiveness in reducing recidivism. Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont studied the American prison system in the early 1830s. After taking a tour of American prisons, they returned to their home

country of France and wrote of the state-sanctioned slavery occurring across the United States, especially in the southern states where prison and state officials profited substantially from inmate labor. In the 1860s, Enoch Wines and Theodore Dwight wrote about the lack of rehabilitation services offered across the states, once again highlighting the ineffectiveness of incarceration without rehabilitation. After the writings of Wines and Dwight, the United States Congress finally addressed the issue of corrections. Shortly after the session, a policy of rehabilitation was established in the Elmira Prison in New York. Elmira was a newly built prison for first-time offenders with the goal of educating inmates to be more productive members of society and avoid further criminal behavior. Zebulon Brockway expanded upon this novel system when he took over management of Elmira Prison, instituting treatment programs designed specifically for individual inmates (Perkinson, 2010).

Elmira Prison represented rehabilitation-centered correction in its infancy. It experienced several problems that lead to mixed results. The programs offered at Elmira were centered on moral and religious lectures instead of basic educational and occupational skills. The facility did not employ occupational programs and utilized corporal punishments liberally when inmates misbehaved. To add to the difficulties, the program attracted poor teachers, lacked a stable structure, and experienced overcrowding. Eventually, Elmira was converted into a maximum-security prison and rehabilitation services were dramatically reduced (Perkinson, 2010).

Rehabilitation services have had numerous successes and failures since their implementation. Each time rehabilitation services become relatively accessible, interest groups and politicians advocating a tougher position on crime start demanding budget cuts that lead to a reduction in prison services. Nevertheless, most prisons at the state and federal levels have some type of rehabilitation program; though, they are not a priority when funding is scarce and they must often respond to constantly expanding and shrinking budgets (Perkinson, 2010).

The Policies

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) was established in 1930 to provide progressive and humane care for inmates. It helped to make the prison service more professional and ensure that administration was consistent. There are 117 institutions supervised by six regional offices (Federal Bureau of Prisons [BOP], 2012). The goal

of the BOP is to protect public safety by offenders serving their sentence in a safe, secure, and humane manner that is also cost efficient. According to the BOP, programs have proven to reduce recidivism. For that reason, they have educational and occupational services available for inmates to participate in if they are willing and there is availability in the program.

Three policies, called program statements, make up education and occupation training programs of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The policies are: 5300.21 Education, Training, and Leisure Time Program Standards, 5350.28 Literacy Program (GED Standards), and 5353.01 Occupation Education Programs. Although these policies are separate, they reference each other and have a great deal of cross over (BOP, 1996; 2012; 2003).

The Education, Training, and Leisure Time Program Standards policy outlines provisions that require education staff to abide by the rules of the Violent Crimes Control and Law Enforcement Act. This requires prisons to provide inmates a handbook with information outlining the effects of program cooperation on Good Conduct Time, each of the program types available to prisoners and important information under each category, and the regulation of leisure and fitness of inmates. It states that each inmate will be allowed to have leisure and wellness activities based on their needs and participation will be recorded. Separate policies for literacy and occupation were created to give a more in-depth policy relating to each category (BOP, 2002; 2003).

The purpose of the Literacy Program is to give inmates the tools necessary to improve their knowledge and skills in academics, occupations, and leisure activities. The current version of this policy was adopted in 2002, but funding for these programs changes annually. Some of the programs that are offered include General Education Development (the standard GED), English as a second language (ESL) classes, library and parenting services, and continuing education. The objective is to give the inmates the opportunity to improve themselves through academic and occupational training. Inmates who complete the program are given certificates of completion and offered graduation ceremonies. In order to decrease idleness, inmates are encouraged to attend these programs, and prisons have increased the number of programs that are offered. There are also expectations placed on the corrections to operate these programs with a high level of professionalism (BOP, 2003).

In the Literacy Program, the certificate of completion is given once the inmate achieves the minimum scores required to achieve a high school diploma in the

state in which the prison is located. Standards of completion thus tend to vary from state to state (BOP, 2003).

The ESL program is non-optional and must be attended by all those who are not proficient in English. Inmates who are undocumented immigrants do not have to attend this program. Inmates who obtain 240 class hours without completing the program are no longer required to attend ESL classes, but these waivers are only granted if the program director does not think that the inmate will ever be able to pass the test. To receive a certificate of completion, inmates must score equivalent to an eighth grade level on the Comprehensive Adult Student Assessment System Reading Certification Test. Inmates must also pass a listening comprehension test (BOP, 1997).

Occupational training is also covered under the Literacy Program. In this section of the policy, occupation education is available based on education and work history of the inmate prior to sentencing. However, many inmates have little to no educational training or work experience. Training is available for those who do not have any marketable skills (BOP, 2003).

Exploratory training and employment programs are two options to receive occupational training for marketable skills. Exploratory training is also available for inmates trying to figure out in what career they may do well. This program gives inmates the opportunity to choose a work field and an internship, and is less than 100 hours. Inmates can then choose to receive additional training in that area or just complete the program and move on to another exploratory program (BOP, 2003).

Employment programs are available for those inmates who have marketable skills coming into prison or who have earned skills while serving a sentence. Those with high school diplomas or GEDs and marketable skills are offered the option to participate in full-day work programs. These programs are located at the prison and can range from leatherworking to maintenance to student teaching. For those who do not have a high school diploma, GED, or do not want to attend continuing education classes, half-day work or education programs are available. These programs range from tutoring services to apprenticeships in manual labor fields. However, inmates are not paid for these services unless funds are allotted through a specific program (BOP, 2003).

The administration of these programs is handled by the supervisor of education for each individual prison. The supervisor for each prison is responsible for ensuring that the programs are consistent with BOP policies and that successful completion is possible. There is a written curriculum that is reviewed annually, outlining

the behavioral objectives, procedures, and minimum expectations for completion of the program. Inmate evaluations have strict standards of measurement and the entire program is periodically reviewed for effectiveness. With exception to programs where credits or certificates of completion involve a set number of hours, programs are accessible monthly and inmates can discontinue their involvement at any time. If available, all inmates are given a certificate of completion or certificate of competency. These certificates are not given by the prison, but instead by an outside agency like a school district or the American Council on Education. If no other certificate is possible but completion has occurred, inmates can receive a certificate of completion from the institution, but priority goes to any outside certification that can be earned. These priorities are given to outside institutions because they look better and are more professional to employers than a prison issued certification (BOP, 2012).

The education standards fall under the supervisor's responsibility, but the standards are outlined in the literacy program policy. Licensed teachers are required to be in classrooms since inmate tutors cannot be the primary teachers for any GED or ESL program. At least 25% of the teachers' workweek must be spent instructing and at least 50% of their 40-hour workweek has to be direct classroom instruction. Teachers must have at least 48 hours of training each year. Educational services have to be offered year-round with minimum breaks for holidays. Program hours must be at least eight hours per day. Exceptions can be made if inmates complete half of their hours in an education program and half in occupational training. Weekend hours are permitted and encouraged. Each specialty program like GED or ESL is required to meet at least one-and-a-half hours of participation every day. Teachers are evaluated by the supervisor of education and by surveys from the inmates. All inmate records must be made available online and must include all information gathered by the prison and all programs the offender attends and completes (BOP, 2003).

The Occupational Training Program policy is a short addendum to the standards set forth in the Literacy Program Policy. It became effective in December 2003. Occupational education includes programs provided by the BOP and contracted agencies. These programs teach job skills to inmates to help them find entry level positions once released. When possible, certification or accreditation is given and the programs are linked to the literacy programs to provide maximum educational benefits (BOP, 2003).

Results

Research suggests that these policies are effective. According to the Bureau of Prisons, these policies have positive effects on pre-release behavior and post-release recidivism. Educational program successes are reported in multiple states including Texas, Florida, and California. Each of these states indicated that inmates completing their programs while incarcerated had lower rates of recidivism (BOP, 2012).

The Bard Prison Initiative (BPI) in New York showed the educational potential of some prisoners. BPI offers full Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Science degrees to inmates who earn them while in prison. Of those who earned their bachelor's degree in this program, 83% did not graduate high school before they were incarcerated. Most of the participants were in their mid-twenties and would soon finish their prison sentences and return to society. Students realized that the educational opportunities would benefit them in prospective employment. Without BPI, these inmates would have only received the basic GED classes (Lagemann, 2011).

National reincarceration rates for the first three years following release are between 50% and 70% (Tripodi, Kim, & Bender, 2009). In a 2001 study, the Correctional Education Association revealed that a 29% reduction in reincarceration for participants in correctional education programs (p. 49). The National Institute of Justice (2014) reports that offender programs have positively affected desistance, although more research must be done as educational programs become more widely used in correctional facilities. In aggregate, these results strongly suggest that educational and occupational training work to lower rates of recidivism in the long term.

In Norway by contrast, the criminal justice system is based on humanity and rehabilitation. Inmates are given jobs and educational services while in prison. When they are close to their release date, Norway helps inmates find employment and housing. On average, Norway's recidivism rate is 20% less than the United States (Norway, 2012).

Issues with Implementation

In discussing barriers to implementation of educational programs, Palmer (2012) explains one of the biggest problems facing initiatives like the education policy at BOP: the majority of funding for prison educational programs comes from the federal government. Americans are un-

likely to elect candidates who seem weak on crime, so many politicians aim to please the public by attacking the few benefits that prisoners do have. Because of this political pressure, federal funding for college programs for inmates has suffered. Felons or those currently incarcerated do not qualify for Pell Grants. This leaves inmates with the burden of paying out of pocket, having inmates' families pay for college classes, or most likely, inmates not attending college at all (Palmer, 2012). Lack of funding has also led to lack of access to academic resources. Prison libraries have limited educational material which limits the ability of the teachers to provide adequate lessons (Hall & Killackey, 2008).

Because of cuts to the education budget, Texas dissolved a program that helped offenders find employment once released. This program had approximately 60,000 inmates participating, making it one of the largest programs offered by Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ). Since the elimination of Project RIO (Reintegration of Offenders), the TDCJ currently offers no employment help upon release. The state releases approximately 170,000 inmates per year with no help in workforce reentry. The budget cuts also caused personnel cuts that included teachers. This caused the GED program to be moved from the classroom to computer-based instruction (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 2012).

For those services that have not been cut, limited space in programs results in inmates not always being able to attend the programs they choose. Moreover, not all units have all programs. The GED program, which is the only one offered at all final placements, is not available at transfer units. Some offenders are sent to units that do not have programs that would be beneficial to them. Program availability is not considered when classifying the inmate and selecting a unit of assignment (Hall & Killackey, 2008).

Suggestions

For the programs to be effective, funding cuts should be avoided; in fact, funding to these educational programs should be increased. Three national organizations as well as state and federal prison systems have reported the success of reducing recidivism through these programs. Political pressure has encouraged government leaders to seek rhetorically expedient policies over the demonstrably effective ones. The need for politicians to appear tough on crime is actually creating conditions that lead

to more crime and higher recidivism. The public needs to be made aware of the effectiveness of education programs to reduce recidivism.

While an increase in direct public funding would be beneficial, there are other ways of funding the educational programs. For college level educational funding, Congress could lift the restriction on Pell Grants in place since 1994 that bans prisoners and felons from receiving federal student aid. If this were to happen, many prisoners would be able to pay for their own college education.

Completion of the GED program should be mandatory unless there is a specific disability that prevents inmates from doing so. GED completion is the most basic requirement for any type of employment. Programs need to focus on teaching inmates marketable skills necessary for them to find stable employment after release. Employment is essentially providing inmates with the basic necessities as well as a non-criminal outlet after release. To facilitate this, prisons need to work with inmates to find employment when released. In the current system, inmates are turned out with only the money in their commissary account and a bus ticket to their destination. Once the inmate arrives at their location, they have no place to live, no food to eat, no transportation, and no identification card. Their best option is to stay with family if their family will still accept them. Dependency is an ineffective way to start fresh and may drive some former inmates back into crime. Policies should focus on minimizing dependency upon release.

Another way to increase funding is to allow private donations to inmate education. Such programs would resemble scholarships programs to high school students. As an incentive, the donations would be tax deductible. Companies could even take in some of these prisoners as unpaid telecommuter interns.

Live work programs could be expanded to become more profitable. Currently, Norway uses a system in which prisoners are responsible for prison upkeep and provide most of the services around the facility. Guards and counselors are the majority of prison employees. The majority of the kitchen staff, maintenance staff, and groundskeeping crews are inmates. At Bastoy, a prison island in Norway, inmates grow their own food, prepare their own meals, and are in charge of keeping their cottages and other prison facilities working properly. In return, inmates receive a small monthly stipend used as the equivalent to commissary money in the United States. Inmates also learn personal accounting skills, get into the habit of attending work, and learn basic employment

skills. Norway's recidivism rate for inmates released from Bastoy is approximately 20% (James, 2013).

Texas inmates built Imperial Sugar and Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad (TCI) through contracts between business owners and the State of Texas (Perkinson, 2010). When the Texas prison system was one of the largest producers of cotton in the nation it could have been a profitable and mutually beneficial project for prisons and inmates. Admittedly, these programs proved beneficial in the past largely only to prison systems and businesses. However, they could still be models for the future. That is, in return for contract laborers, companies could provide educational training for inmates and pay less than minimum wage. The prison could then take half the pay and put the other half in inmates' commissary accounts. Inmates who participate in these programs would receive hands-on training and additional income to buy hygiene products, pay for educational services, or build a savings account for use upon release. Bringing contract labor back into the prison system could save a great deal of money in the correctional institution and the cost to taxpayers while maintaining funding for necessary and beneficial programs. Bringing contract labor back into the prison system could save a great deal of money within the correctional institution and the cost to taxpayers while maintaining funding for necessary and beneficial programs.

Religion in prison is found throughout the world and religious organizations volunteer to spend time in the prisons teaching and giving other religious services. There is little need for the actual expense that most U.S. states budget for religion because volunteers will do it at no cost to the state. Texas currently spends \$98,000 on education programs in the form of high school equivalency courses, technical schools, vocational training, and other education services; in contrast, spending on religious services is approximately \$2.3 million (Texas Department of Corrections, 2012). Other states are not much different in their spending practices. There is no need for excessive spending on something that would be given freely. Educational services have been proven effective in reducing recidivism. Therefore, spending priority should go to education instead of religion.

Privately owned prisons have their own set of problems when it comes to education and rehabilitation. Private prisons have a greater interest in keeping people in prisons and high recidivism rates than they do in education and successful rehabilitation. Private prison pay should be changed to reflect the effectiveness of their program. For example, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) contracts with the Federal Bureau of

Prisons to house prisoners nationwide. Currently, CCA is the fifth largest prison system in the world following behind four other American prison systems (Correction Corporation of America, 2012). CCA is a privately owned company; therefore, they do not have to follow the standards of employment established by state and the federal government. The same is true for their programs. Employment and program requirements can be substandard, leading to the use of ineffective teachers and unregulated programs. One of the most touted goals of CCA is safe, cost effective incarceration. If cost efficient incarceration is the goal, how do they plan to reduce recidivism? Once again, cost efficiency of today does not outweigh the benefit of reducing recidivism tomorrow.

Conclusion

The United States corrections system may be one of the oldest in the world, but it still has a great deal of room for improvement. Instead of spending a little more up front to keep released inmates from returning to prison, the same amount of money or greater will be spent on multiple returns to prison, potentially leading to a lifetime of prison funding for a majority of prisoners. Simply locking someone up and ignoring them is clearly ineffective. Over time, prisoners will become out of touch with society, fall behind in technological literacy, develop a wide gap in their employment history, and possess out-

dated skills. The United States releases approximately 1,700 inmates back into society every day. Most are undereducated, unskilled, and have little-to-no familial support. Only 29% receive vocational training, and most have few marketable skills or are not literate enough to complete an application for employment. On average, only 35% receive educational training while incarcerated. When combined with the fact that the United States has a recidivism rate of 43% in the first three years and 66% overall, it is clear current programs are not working (Keppler & Potter, 2005). Perhaps, if more inmates were educated and given opportunities to learn basic employment skills, the recidivism rate in the United States could be reduced. Although not all recidivism can be predicted or prevented, a substantial portion of it can be by addressing the problems former inmates experience after release, including the lack of education and trade skills, and difficulty finding employment. If correctional institutions develop and adequately implement programs designed to address these problems, recidivism rates would most likely drop.

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Resisting Tyranny: Human Rights Organizations, International Organizations, and Promotion of the Rule of Law in Argentina

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ABSTRACT: *The Madres de Plaza de Mayo successfully contributed to the peaceful overthrow of Argentina's military dictatorship and eventual installation of a healthy democracy. It accomplished this through contributions to civil society: promoting human rights laws, accountability, rule of law, and social justice. We argue that the Madres' success must also be evaluated by their success in condemning military personnel for human rights crimes. The Madres received aid from the Organization of American States' Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights, which influenced the government to establish the rule of law more effectively by placing the accused soldiers on trial. Using Argentina's democratic transition and The Madres de Plaza de Mayo as a case study, we argue that human rights organizations can bring about nonviolent democratic transitions, but not sustainable democratic institutions; however, in conjunction with intergovernmental organizations that have international legal jurisdiction, human rights organizations can more effectively establish the rule of law in the state, leading to a more sustainable democratic institution.*

Contextual Background and Research Objectives

Argentina's democratization history includes severe regime instability as the country alternated between authoritarian regimes and democracies in the 20th century. The second wave of democratization from 1945 to 1988 led many Latin American states, including Argentina, to democratization; however, many countries in the region soon returned to authoritarian regimes after this period (Berg-Schlosser, 2009). Following a military coup, Argentina reinstalled a "ferce military dictatorship between 1976 and 1983" ("Argentina Country Report," 2012, p. 3). That regime eventually collapsed during the Dirty War due to a popular social movement towards re-democratization in reaction to the "circumstances of political violence" and "ensuing massive violations of human rights" committed by the military (Jelin, 1994, p. 38). The most widely known human rights violations committed by the military regime occurred when the military abducted children and babies in order to provide these children to "high ranking military officers and their accomplices" (Bennett, Ludlow, & Reed), but other violations included kidnapping individuals and throwing them out of planes over the ocean to make them 'disappear,' hence the name *desaparecidos*.

The human rights movement was an important liberal cause in Latin America, but nowhere was it such "an essential element of the new democracy" (Jelin, 1994, p. 46), as in Argentina. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo and the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, two well-recognized human rights organizations, advocated the convictions of war criminals through advocacy marches, letters, petitions, and personal testimonies. Meanwhile, the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), another important human rights organization (HRO), provided data and legal expertise to facilitate the legal condemnation of the human rights abuses from the Dirty War. Their influence on the recognition of human rights violations in Argentina and their additional influence on increasing the rule of law in Argentina can be divided into three historical phases: 1) the initial reaction of the democratic Argentine government to human rights violations before the amnesty laws of the late 1980s and early 1990s; 2) the investigation, trials, and rulings conducted by the Inter-American Court; and 3) the actual convictions of the Dirty War human rights violators in Argentine national courts after the repealing of the amnesty laws. Through these historical phases, we argue the collaboration between the HROs and the Inter-American Court caused an increase in the independence of the judiciary and

equality before the law, thereby also increasing the rule of law in Argentina's democracy.

This essay first identifies the methods and strategies used by the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, and the CELS to spread awareness and increase the recognition of the human rights violations by the military during the Dirty War. The middle section of this article describes the different phases of the Argentine government's condemnation of war criminals, beginning with the initial national condemnation before international involvement, then the Argentine government's reaction to Inter-American Court rulings, and finally the national courts' subsequent convictions of military officials who committed war crimes during the Dirty War. The final section of the essay discusses how the relation between the HROs, the Inter-American Court, and the Argentine government affected and continues to affect the rule of law in Argentina.

Introduction

Over the past century, the most recent wave of democratization (Berg-Schlosser, 2009), the increasing number of HROS, and the creation of international law tribunals have sparked scholarly research on each of these individual themes. Previous scholarship explored the relation between human rights organizations and democratic governments (Bonner, 2005; Jelin, 1994), the relation between human rights and international law (Cavallaro, 2008; Hillebrecht, 2012; Huneus, 2010), and the relation between democratic governments and international law tribunals (Benvenisti, 2008; Falk, 2014; Hillebrecht, 2012; Huneus, 2010; Smulovitz, 2010). However, scholars have yet to measure the domestic effects of the relationship between human rights organizations and international law tribunals on national governments and democracy.

Currently, a vast amount of literature exists on democratization theories, which explain both how and why democratic transitions occur successfully and also how these democratic transitions can establish sustainable democracies. Dahl (1999) argues that democracies are beneficial for the people in that they allow citizens to choose the governments and laws that govern them, protect citizens' fundamental rights, and provide political and social space for higher moral standards. However, the transitional road to democracy is a time-oriented, multifaceted process (Rustow, 1970). Moreover, transitional democracies are plagued by issues such as hav-

ing a delegative democracy in which too much power is concentrated in the executive branch, or an illiberal democracy, where elections are held but essential elements of democracy such as rule of law and separation of powers are not fully implemented (Sorenson, 2007). Some scholars, however, hold that states that contain an active civil society with popular mobilizations have experienced the most successful democratic transitions and become more stable democracies (Cavallaro, 2008; Sorenson, 2007).

All in all, the literature consistently shows that HROs greatly contributed to the democratic process in Latin America (Bonner, 2005; Fallon, 2008; Jelin, 1994; Weylen, 1993, 1994), but the sustainability of the democracy, especially in Argentina, depended also on the presence of the Inter-American Court for enforcement and increased accountability (Bonner, 2005; Jelin, 1994). While democratization is highly contingent upon local societal changes, it is also highly influenced by the international dimension. There is a bleeding between the levels of analysis, or, as Weinstein would put it, between the realms of political action. (Oprisko, 2015; Weinstein, 1970). Consequently, our research builds off of this past literature to show the causal relationship between the collaborative actions of HROs, international law tribunals, the Argentine government, and the measurable increase of rule of law.

Methods

To examine the relationship between the HROs' activities and advocacy, the Inter-American Court's procedures and rulings, and the Argentine government's subsequent convictions of war criminals from the Dirty War, we used local news reports, international magazine articles, scholarly articles, court rulings and reports from the Inter-American Court, as well as data from the CELS. These primary and secondary sources historically trace the actions of the HROs, the Inter-American Court, and the Argentine judiciary. To supplement this historical research we utilized the Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index and the World Report's Human Rights Watch Reports to provide empirical analysis of the increase in rule of law in the Argentine government. Some of the current indices that seek to measure rule of law in nations and territories are the Freedom House's Freedom in the World ratings, the Global Integrity Index, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Polity IV, and the World Justice Project's (WJP) Rule of Law Index, among others. Many scholars have used these indices to measure

democratization efforts and rule of law more specifically (Andrews, 2004; Barro, 1997, 2000; Joireman, 2001, 2004; Rigoban, 2005). However, Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and Skaaning (2009; 2009) recently analyzed the reliability, validity, and usefulness of these rule of law indices and found that each individually exhibits different problems with time and geographical scope, conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation.

Despite these drawbacks, the Vera Institute of Justice notes that indices are nonetheless helpful because they “make complex information and ideas easily understandable and facilitate comparisons across place and time (Parsons, 2008, p. 4). Moreover, Munck and Verkuilen (2002) assert that these indices are “tapping into the same fundamental underlying realities” (p. 29) of rule of law. Therefore, they should still be used by scholars because “having a data set on democracy, even if it is partially flawed, is better than not having any data set at all” (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002, p. 31).

To operationalize our variables appropriately, we have chosen a strategy that combines quantitative and qualitative methods, follows an appropriate time span for the case study of Argentina, and narrows our focus for conceptualization by using specific indicators of rule of law. We gathered quantitative aggregated and disaggregated freedom, civil liberty, and rule of law scores from the Freedom House’s Freedom in the World ratings and then complemented this data with the qualitative narrative country reports on Argentina from the Freedom in the World reports. Skaaning (2009) notes that the presence of narrative country reports in the Freedom House Index increases the validity of their measures as it provides both objective and subjective indicators, which are very appropriate for measuring rule of law. From the Freedom House’s quantitative data, we conducted a document analysis of the reports to map the progression of domestic court cases into conceptualization matrices. This allowed us to determine which indicators of rule of law would be most pertinent for our data analysis, as will be discussed below. In addition, we collected quantitative data on the number of cumulative convictions of war criminals in Argentina from the Human Rights Watch Reports. The Freedom House indices, spanning from 1998 to 2014, and the Human Rights Watch Reports, spanning from 1989 to 2014, are the indices with the most appropriate time spans for our research objective.

We rely on the definition of “rule of law” from the United Nations’ former Secretary General, Kofi Annan’s (2014), description as:

a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publically promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.

We focus on only two indicators of rule of law: an independent judiciary and equality before the law. Based on our qualitative documentary analysis and matrices, these two indicators in the Argentine national courts were the most affected by the actions of the HROs and the Inter-American Court. By focusing on two specific indicators within rule of law and supplementing this with objective data on the number of war criminal convictions in Argentina, our results will be less affected by bias, and the usage of multiple sources from Freedom House and the WJP’s Human Rights Watch will increase the reliability of our findings.

Strategies and Methods of the Argentine Human Rights Organizations

The Madres de Plaza de Mayo, the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, and the CELS spread awareness of the human rights violations during the Dirty War in Argentina in two very different ways. Jelin (1994) and Bonner (2005) emphasize the distinction between these human rights groups, and categorize them as either “affected” or “solidarity” groups. Oprisko (2012) examines the level of engagement of revisionist (reformist or revolutionary) groups predicated upon the diminution of human dignity. The HROs we examine all fall into the category of reformist groups because the focus of their revision is on strengthening adherence to existing law as a form of humanitarian governance. The Madres’ and Abuelas’ influence results from their experience with war crimes, as their children and grandchildren are among the disappeared. Thus, their group is comprised of mothers and grandmothers directly affected by the abductions. The Madres’ and the Abuelas’ main contributions come from raising awareness of the abuses and working with the presidents after the transition to condemn the human rights abusers legally. They increased awareness for these human rights abuses by marching

weekly at the Plaza de Mayo holding pictures of their abducted children. The Madres also invested in an advertisement in *La Prensa*, a dominant Argentine newspaper, on Mother's Day, that pleaded for a legitimate legal process to prosecute the military officials for abducting their children (Tedla, 2009). These actions later caused a media frenzy, leading to both national and international recognition of their plight and claims (Knudson, 1997; Tedla, 2009). The Madres de Plaza de Mayo was the first human rights group to protest actively and successfully against the actions of the authoritarian regime of Argentina (Waylen, 1994). In contrast, the CELS is the "solidarity" group, and its aim is to provide professional legal support (Bonner, 2005). Thus, the CELS emerged as a group of "professional 'human rights experts'" (Smulovitz, 2010, p.247), and is not only the primary legal expert on such cases, but also the most reliable statistics expert for human rights abuses in Argentina (Knudson, 1997).

Smulovitz (2010) argues that "support structures" consisting of local lawyers and a "new rights advocacy network of nongovernmental organizations" (p. 234) significantly contributed to Argentina's judicialization process by "democratiz[ing] access to the courts" (p.237). In this instance, the "affected" groups formed part of the "new rights advocacy network," while the CELS formed the legal section of the support structure (p.234).

The human rights organizations' work towards domestic condemnation of the war criminals was exemplary even before the Inter-American Court began to report on and hold trials for the war crimes. In 1977, before the democratic transition occurred, the Madres de Plaza de Mayo created a petition consisting of 24,000 signatures and also a list of 537 desaparecidos and sent it to the Argentine government. Although this increased attention internally (Tedla, 2009), the Madres and the Abuelas continued to assert their claims and demands further by working more directly with powerful government officials. With a large amount of power concentrated in the presidency, the Madres and Abuelas, by working with various presidents like Raúl Alfonsín, Carlos Menem, and Néstor Kirchner, immediately attempted to utilize the executive and judiciary branches of government to condemn the military branch of the past. The two "affected" groups demanded not only truth and justice from their government, but also made "demands anchored in the judiciary, in politics, in culture, and in society" (Jelin, 1994, p.48). Most importantly, the "solidarity" HROs, such as CELS, complemented the work of the "affected" HROs by providing legal skills and data both nationally and internationally (Bonner, 2005).

The Ineffectiveness of the National Government's Reaction to War Crimes

Raúl Alfonsín, the first democratically elected president after the transition, initially led the campaign to convict the military officials by creating the National Commission on Disappeared People (CONADEP) in 1983. The Madres, Abuelas, and CELS all worked with CONADEP to compile historical information for the prosecution of war criminals. After this collaboration, CONADEP produced an extensive report known as "Nunca Más" or "Never Again" in 1984 that revealed 1,351 military and police as human rights offenders (Knudson, 1997). In collaboration with the Abuelas, Alfonsín also established the National Genetics Bank that compiled genetic information that not only aided the prosecution but also allowed the Abuelas to identify their lost (Bonner, 2005). However, although Alfonsín may have had genuine intentions, he did not "adopt [all] principles and demands of the movements . . . in their full meanings [because of his focus on pragmatic politics and the] need to negotiate and make compromises with powerful political actors" (Jelin, 1994, p. 46).

Condemnation of six military officials, including Ramon J. Camps, and the military presidents during the Dirty War, Jorge Rafael Videla and Roberto Eduardo Viola, provoked strong military reactions against Alfonsín, pressuring him to invoke amnesty laws (Knudson, 1997). Regardless of his constructive measures, Alfonsín tried to appease the military, which still held a great deal of power in the post-transition period. To appease them, he passed legislation known as Final Point in 1986, which limited the time span for penal action against human rights offenders to only 60 days; and Due Obedience in 1987, which provided amnesty for officials at the level of lieutenant colonel and below under the premise that they were simply "obeying orders" (Bonner, 2005, pp. 60–61). All in all, these pardoned more than 260 officials (Bonner, 2005), and this event was later described as "a grave injustice to the judicial power" (Knudson, 1997, p. 106).

However, the amnesty laws did not pardon the crime of stealing babies, so the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo could still help prosecute cases specific to that crime. With the help of President Menem and the creation of CONADI, the National Commission on the Right to Identity, which provided even further genetic data to help identify children, the Abuelas prosecuted several criminals (Bonner, 2005). Nonetheless, out of the 1,351 people accused of human rights violations, 1,195 were investigated in court under the Military Justice Code; yet, a mere seven indi-

viduals were officially convicted, and not a single person served a full sentence for their violation (Bonner, 2005).

Ultimately, while Alfonsín and the Madres had the opportunity to fortify both the Argentine democratic institution and “civilian control over the military” (Bonner, 2005, p. 60), the politicized nature of the Argentine state, especially controlled by hyperpresidentialism and a still powerful military, unfortunately restricted the national courts. For this reason, the Madres, Abuelas, and CELS alone were unable to increase rule of law and inclusion in Argentine democratic institutions directly after the transition period. Therefore, the HROs’ only method of combating the national issue of rule of law illegitimacy was to utilize international courts and organizations, such as the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Court and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of 1979, placing pressure on the Argentine government to prosecute offenders accordingly.

The HROs and the Inter-American Court

The combined efforts of the Madres, the Abuelas, and the CELS in working with the Inter-American Court must be highlighted to gain a full understanding of the advocacy for war crimes prosecution. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo began sending letters to international human rights organizations, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Amnesty International (Tedla, 2009). The Madres and Abuelas then gained further attention from the Organization of American States (OAS) after their weekly protests gained international publicity. The OAS deployed its Inter-American Commission to investigate the human rights offenses that the Madres claimed. Though the Argentine government surprisingly invited the Inter-American Court to perform this investigation (Knudson, 1997), several government officials, including one Argentine judge, did not fully cooperate with the Inter-American Court’s request for documentation and data and actually raided NGOs’ offices to impede the court in gaining an official list of all the human rights victims (“In Search of the Disappeared,” 1979).

The letter campaigns, weekly marches, and the Commission’s report on the human rights situation in Argentina still did not provide the legal action that the HROs desired. Therefore, the Madres, Abuelas, and the CELS began their international legal activities by submitting a petition to the Inter-American Commission that accused the Argentine government of not respecting their right


to judicial guarantees, the right to effective protection, and the obligation to respect the rights protected by the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights (Lapacó, 2000). The Inter-American Court thus proceeded with an investigation and prosecution of the alleged complaint and finally found the Argentine government guilty of said crimes. The court advised Argentina to comply with the decision of the Court by adopting necessary laws to ensure that human rights abuses could be pursued and the criminals would be prosecuted (Lapacó, 2000).

In working with the Inter-American Court, the HROs once again worked together to conduct research and compile the data, personal testimonies, and legal arguments that the Inter-American Court used to pressure the Argentine government to prosecute war criminals (Huneus, 2010). After taking the Argentine government to court, the Inter-American Court initially ruled that the Argentine government must pay reparations to ex-political prisoners, and later ruled that the families of the disappeared must be compensated as well. Argentina did, in fact, accept this ruling in 1992, passed the law of reparations, and began compensating ex-political prisoners and families of the disappeared. Bonner (2005) recorded that 12,800 ex-political prisoners had been compensated by Argentina by 2000. However, according to Bonner (2005), the majority of punishments administered by the international courts were reparations paid by military officials and the government to the victims, and the HROs rejected monetary punishment on the grounds that it was a compromise “like prostitution . . . [that did not provide] sufficient justice” (p. 66) for the abused and did not act as a punitive deterrent for future human rights abuses.

Thus the HROs continued to fight for additional legal actions to condemn human rights abusers in Argentina, and in 1994 the acceptance of international treaties by the Argentine government provided this legal guarantee. Following the international attention and rulings, the Argentine government embraced international treaties that recognized human rights such as the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention, and integrated them into their Constitution in 1994 during de la Rúa’s presidency (Huneus, 2010). In fact, the government even gave these international treaties “legal superiority over national laws” (Bonner, 2005, p. 67).

The acceptance of the international treaties paved the way for the next biggest step in increasing the rule of law: the revocation of the amnesty laws from Alfonsín and Menem’s presidencies (Bonner, 2005). The Abuelas

Figure 1. Cumulative Number of Domestic Convictions in Argentine National Courts of War Criminals from the Dirty War



Data gathered from World Justice Project's Human Rights Watch Reports, 2006–14.


and the CELS had a special effect on the amnesty laws' abolition as they launched a formal complaint against the Argentine government and started the debate about revoking the amnesty laws (Rohter, 2006). In June of 2005, the Argentine Supreme Court formally declared the amnesty laws unconstitutional (Rohter, 2006). Even more impressive, the Congress repealed the previous military code of justice (Hillebrecht, 2012). Santiago A. Canton, a journalist for *La Nación*, a prominent Argentine newspaper, proudly claimed that revoking the amnesty laws "has possibly been the most important decision for the strengthening of the rule of law in Argentina and in all of the region" (as cited in Hillebrecht, 2012, p.961). From these government decisions and pressure provided by the Inter-American Court and HROs, the Argentine judiciary could move forward with its own domestic cases to prosecute human rights violations from the Dirty War, contributing to the increase of two indicators of rule of law: an independent judiciary and equality before the law.

The Effect of the HROs and the Inter-American Court on Rule of Law in Argentina

Figure 1 demonstrates the drastic increase in domestic convictions of the Dirty War war criminals in Argentina after the Supreme Court found amnesty laws unconstitutional. From the first two prosecutions in 2006, the Argentine judiciary indicted, prosecuted, and convicted a total of 416 war criminals by 2014.

The Freedom in the World Methodology (2014) specifies that they evaluate an independent judiciary based on the following three questions that specifically relate to the constitutional amendments and convictions made by the Argentine judiciary:

- Is the judiciary subject to interference from the executive branch of government?
- Do executive, legislative, and other governmental authorities comply with judicial decisions, and are these decisions enforced?

Figure 2. Argentina's Freedom Rating

Data gathered from the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” Reports, 1998-2013. A country or territory is assigned a rating (7 to 1) for civil liberties—based on its total scores for civil liberties questions. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom.

- Do powerful private concerns comply with judicial decisions, and are decisions that run counter to the interests of powerful actors effectively enforced?


These convictions by the Argentine government demonstrate that the Supreme Court distanced itself from the previous executive influence and repealed the amnesty laws, thus allowing the domestic court to prosecute the human rights abusers that had previously been pardoned by Alfonsín and Menem. Therefore, the judiciary became less politicized and more independent. We argue that these convictions demonstrate the increase in equality and accountability before the law based on indicators from the Freedom in the World Methodology. The indicator raises the question, “Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?” (“Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology,” 2014). These convictions indicate that the military and police officials, previously regarded as “powerful actors” and a specific “segment of the population,” were

consequently considered equal to all other Argentine citizens because they were no longer pardoned by the amnesty laws and henceforth held accountable by nationally recognized international treaties (“Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology,” 2014).

Additionally, Freedom in the World includes the question, “Do citizens have the means of effective petition and redress when their rights are violated by state authorities?” (“Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology,” 2014). These convictions further demonstrate that when the Madres, Abuelas, and CELS, composed of Argentine citizens, chose to appeal to the national courts to prosecute the past military and police authorities, the Argentine state finally indicted and convicted the abusers with legitimate legal procedures and authority.

In relation to these criminal convictions, the Freedom and Civil Liberties Ratings in Figures 2 and 3 mirror this increase in rule of law in that both show an increase of freedom from a score of 3 to 2 in 2004, the year after the amnesty laws were first repealed. The increase in

Figure 3. Argentina’s Civil Liberty Rating




Data gathered from the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” Reports, 1998-2013. A country or territory is assigned a rating (7 to 1) for civil liberties—based on its total scores for civil libertie questions. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom.

freedom remains constant with both the Freedom Rating and Civil Liberties rating reporting a constant score of 2 from 2004 to the most recent report in 2013.

The Rule of Law rating in Figure 4 proves slightly more difficult to interpret from the aggregated rule of law scores. In 2007, the rule of law score decreased from 11 to 10, but then the score returns from a score of 10 in 2010 to a score of 11 in 2012 (no report is available for 2011). When we examined Freedom House’s narrative country report (Table 1) for rule of law during those years, we found that other aspects of rule of law unrelated to the effect of the HROs and Inter-American court on the Argentine national war criminal trials had decreased the rule of law from 2006 to 2007. These indicators included a further decrease in public safety, crime, and drug sales, continued “arbitrary arrests and abuse by police,” and continued discrimination against various minority groups (“Argentina,” 2007; “Argentina,” 2008; “Argentina,” 2009; “Argentina,” 2010). Moreover, politicization of the judiciary increased once more because

Congress altered the judicial selection process for the Supreme Court. While these other rule of law indicators are nonetheless still problematic, they do not directly correlate with the human rights offenses and its effects on the rule of law.

What this does indicate for our empirical analysis is that, as Skaaning (2009) and Munck & Verkuilen (2002) show, aggregated scores for rule of law fail to reveal the entire picture and qualitative country reports can supplement the quantitative scores to allow scholars to decipher what portions of rule of law were affected by various independent variables. In other words, the qualitative matrices we created from the document analysis of the narrative country reports in Table 1 allowed us to see that rule of law, the dependent variable, was affected more in 2006 and 2007 by independent variables unrelated to the HROs, the Inter-American Court, and their effect on war criminal convictions. In addition, the Rule of Law rating does not have an adequate time span for the present case study and therefore does not allow for the comparison of rule of

Figure 4. Argentina's Rule of Law Rating

Data gathered from the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” Subcategory Scores Report, 2006–2014. No data available for 2011. Scores range from 0–16; 16 is the most free and 0 is the least free, or “not free.”

law before and after the first convictions of war criminals in 2006, creating a limitation for this index that once more only the narrative country reports can counterbalance.

However, when specifically looking at the independent judiciary and equality under the law indicators by evaluating presidential pardons and official indictments of war criminals through the document matrices we created, one can see that the HROs and Inter-American Court decreased the power of the executive branch, providing a system of checks and balances. Specific changes included: 1) a decreased ability to pardon military and police officials for war crimes; 2) increased the ability of the Argentine judiciary to indict and prosecute the war criminals; and 3) increased the independence of the Argentine judiciary. This evolution is reflected in the Freedom House scores, which rated Argentina as only “Partly Free” overall in both 2002 and 2003, but then returns Argentina to “Free” status in 2004 because of two main factors: “the stabilization of the country’s electoral democracy and important innovations in fighting cor-

ruption and ending military and police impunity” (“Argentina,” 2004). This significant increase in Argentina’s freedom rating in 2004, the Freedom, Civil Liberties, and Rule of Law ratings, and the cumulative number of convictions thus connote the tangible results that the Madres and Abuelas and the CELS in combination with the Inter-American Court achieved by pressuring the Argentine government into formally convicting the war criminals in national courts.

In conclusion, the historical data from primary and secondary sources documented above develops the relations between the human rights organizations, the Inter-American Court, and the domestic Argentine courts. While this historical data creates a causal relation between the three actors, it does not provide a measurable change in rule of law. The addition of the Freedom in the World Index’s scores and the collection of data to document the cumulative number of convicted war criminals demonstrates how the advocacy, petition, and legal actions of the Madres, Abuelas, and CELS combined with the Inter-

American Court's reports and rulings actually resulted in the measurable increase of rule of law in Argentina.

Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

The data and analysis presented above shed light on how HROs can help strengthen the rule of law inside their respective national governments with the help of inter-governmental organizations with international law jurisprudence. Huneus (2010) notes that scholars should devote more attention to understanding factors that "can create mutually beneficial incentives" for compliance to international law, which could "enhance the Court's power" (p.116). Following the present research, it is possible that the combination of human rights organizations, as a sector of civil society, could provide this type of incentive for national governments. In other words, when HROs combine with international law tribunals to pass legislation and prosecute those who break such legislation, the connection that HROs provide for civil society will also provide extra incentive for national governments to comply with international law. As Cavallaro and Brewer (2008) assert, intergovernmental organizations with jurisdiction on international law have more successful compliance outcomes in national governments when their procedures and rules expand on local civil society actors' "long term efforts to advance human rights" (p.770). Conversely, human rights organizations with little hard power or leverage in their national governments may utilize international law tribunals to successfully attain the long-term goals for which they strive. In this instance, the Madres, Abuelas, and CELS were less effective in the post-transition democratization phase in formally convicting human rights violators due to hyper-presidentialism (Waylen, 1993), and were forced instead to turn to the Inter-American Court to create a mutually enforcing team. Thus, the HROs provided the local mobilization, and the Inter-American Court provided a "substantive source of law" that "empower[ed] domestic constituents to mobilize for their rights" in a manner perceived as legitimate by the Argentine government (Hillebrecht, 2012, p.965). Together, they increased both the probability of Argentina complying with international

law, promoting human rights, and advancing the establishment of rule of law.

Our research also shows that quantitative and aggregated indices for measuring rule of law are inadequate. Narrative country reports help show the reasons behind "measured" quantitative scores and also show how different aspects of rule of law, like independent judiciary and equality before the law, all contribute to the final aggregated score. Without subcategory scores and the narrative country reports from Freedom House, the data on rule of law would have showed a completely different picture and also would have discounted the positive contribution of war criminal convictions to rule of law in the Argentine democracy.

From these findings, it is clear that more research is needed first to examine theories of compliance when HROs' actions and impact are added into the equation of national and international courts. Scholars in the future should also conduct more research that spans a broader scope of countries and time periods to find if HROs can provide this incentive globally, not just within the Inter-American Court and singular countries like Argentina. Moreover, democracy and rule of law indices in particular should continue attempting to improve their methodologies through the addition of broader time spans, qualitative analysis to supplement the quantitative scores, and the increased availability of disaggregated scores with clear coding descriptions. Only by strengthening the methodologies behind the democracy indices can future scholars formulate clearer conceptions of the increase and decrease of democratization indicators, and only by further investigating the linkages between human rights organizations, international law, and national government compliance can we understand how these three factors can contribute to increase in rule of law and acceptance of human rights legislation globally.

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Appendix. Qualitative Document Analysis Matrix

Year	Pardoning of Officials?	Independent Judiciary?	Human Rights Groups Improvement	Indictments
1990	Yes, Menem and Alfonsin pardoned many officials (1986, 1987, and early 1990s)	No, considered politicized and inefficient	None	None
1998	No, decrease - court ruled that 5 former military officials should be prosecuted.	No, considered politicized and inefficient	None	None
1999	Yes, increase - 2 former military officials appointed to top provincial justice posts	Yes, increased independence - politicization still an issue	Constant - no change	None
2000	No, decrease - De la Rúa dismissed the 9-member military tribunal in favor of the civilian tribunals for prosecution of past war crimes	No data	No data	No data
2001	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	Yes, improved during De la Rúa's presidency	None
2002* Changed to "Partly Free"	No, decrease - November overthrow of amnesty laws	Constant - no change	Yes, continued increase	None
2003	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	25 indictments of former military officials including military dictator, General Leopoldo Galtieri
2004* Change back to "Free"	Constant - no change	Yes, increase - Kirchner begins process of removing several Supreme Court justices to decrease politicization; additionally, Kirchner signed decree to limit presidential influence of Supreme Court judge appointments and NGOs can now participate in selection process	Constant - no change	Yes, increase - Kirchner signed the decree to indict military officials formally for human rights war crimes
2005	No, decrease - Supreme Court officially abolishes amnesty laws because of their unconstitutionality	Yes, continued increase for the same reasons as above; 2 women appointed as justices	Constant - no change	Constant - no change

Appendix. Continued

Year	Pardoning of Officials?	Independent Judiciary?	Human Rights Groups Improvement	Indictments
2006	No, decrease - Supreme Court invalidates presidential pardons granted to Menem by 3 military officials	No, decrease - additional issues with judicial insecurity arise (unrelated to war crimes)	Constant - no change	Yes, increase - first prosecution and conviction of military official, Juliio Simon, after the abolishment of amnesty laws; indictment of 3 additional officials who were granted presidential pardon under Menem
2007	Constant - no change	No, decrease - increased politicization of judiciary and executive branch influence due to changes in how justices are selected	Yes, increase - civil society as a whole is noted as "robust" and active in society	Yes, increase - a priest was convicted for war crimes during the Dirty War and the detainment of Isabel Peron in Spain for her war crimes places additional pressure on Argentine government
2008	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	Yes, increase - Jorge Videla transferred to prison and Ricardo Cavallo (previously in Spain, but extradited to Argentina) convicted for human rights abuses
2009	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	Yes, increase - another extradition case from Spain to Argentina to prosecute a navy pilot for human rights abuses during the Dirty War
2010	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	Yes, increase - Jorge Videla and 20 military and police officials convicted for war crimes
2011	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	Constant - no change	Yes, increase - 12 military and police officials convicted for war crimes, including Ricardo Cavallo and Alfredo Astiz
2012	Constant - no change	No, decrease - continued issues with corruption and politicization.	Constant - no change	Yes, increase - Jorge Videla convicted for additional war crimes and 50 additional years are added to his former life sentence

Data gathered from Freedom House "Freedom in the World" Reports, 1998–2013.

“But I Learned All This In High School”: Understanding Why Students Drop Core Courses

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ABSTRACT: *This study examines student attrition in core curriculum courses in one institution of higher education in Texas. The focus on core curriculum courses is important because students regularly report that they studied the material in high school and they often wonder why they must study it again. Despite the alleged exposure to the material, students still drop core courses at high levels when intuitively one thinks that they would thrive in a course on a subject they have already studied. The present research builds upon limited previous research on student attrition and finds that students who are more actively engaged in courses tend to stay in the course and earn higher grades. While the findings are not surprising, they are instructive and can lead to the development of strategies for helping students persevere in core courses.*

Higher education institutions in the United States continually confront the problem of student attrition: those students who drop out of an academic program or completely withdraw from a university or college before earning a degree. This research examines student attrition in courses identified as part of a university's core, or general, education requirement. Many students complain about having to take these courses because they say they have studied the same subjects in high school. A college instructor might argue that already knowing the material would give a student an advantage, but many students still drop out of core courses. This paper poses a simple query: “Why do students drop core courses?”

Research on student attrition from higher education institutions has long been a subject of keen interest for academic administrators and practitioners. When students drop out of a college or university, there is a financial loss to the institution as well as a loss of potential to society. Administrators at colleges and universities work diligently to find and implement methods to reduce student attrition. Much of this work focuses on developing programs to keep students at an institution or in a specific academic program, rather than looking at the attrition in a particular course or type of courses.

This essay first briefly examines the problems caused by student attrition and considers the theories developed to explain the phenomenon. I then turn to describing the methodology used to understand the reasons why students drop core courses at West Texas A&M University. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of how one can use the findings uncovered by the pres-

ent research to limit the amount of student attrition in core courses.

Student Attrition, Its Causes, and Its Solutions

Student attrition is not a new problem. Kelly, Kendrick, Newgent, and Lucas (2007) report that the national rate of students leaving public colleges and universities has remained constant, “amounting to about 45% over the course of the last one hundred years” (p. 1021). In one study, Tinto (1982) reports that student attrition after the freshman year was 19% for category one universities. Raley (2007) frames the statistics in terms of college completion:

Graduation rates at public four-year colleges and universities hover at around 40% of entering students. Their private counterparts fare only slightly better; 57% of their newly minted freshmen go on to graduate. Two-year public colleges have a worse record, graduating fewer than 30% of their students. The record has not improved in three decades, although more people attend college now than in the past. (p. 74)

Researchers have worked for many decades to understand the reasons for the high number of student departures from college or university study (Raley, 2007). While much of this scholarship has focused on complete withdrawal, the theories developed by this research can inform an examination of student attrition in a particu-

lar course or type of courses. The Center for the Study of College Student Retention's (2008) website usefully summarizes the major retention and attrition theories. Probably the first research seeking reasons for college student retention is McNeely (1938). A largely descriptive study, it examined the many factors in college student retention. Summerskill (1962) marks the beginning of a renewed interest in the study of attrition in the 1960s, finding evidence that the reason why some students stay in school while others leave is closely related to personality differences.

The rich body of research on college student persistence and attrition has resulted in several key theoretical frameworks. Probably the most well known among researchers is Tinto's (1975; 1993; 1997; 1998) Theory of Student Integration. Tinto posits that students who are academically and socially integrated into a college environment are more likely to persist in their education. He argued that college dropout

is an outcome of a longitudinal process of interactions between the individual and the academic and social systems of the institution (peers, faculty, administration) with such experience coming to bear on the individual's commitment to college completion and commitment to the institution.
(Tinto 1975, p.94)

In his later work, Tinto (1998) found that the classroom dynamics affected student persistence. He advocated shared, collaborative learning among students.

Bean and Metzner (1985; Bean, 1990) extended Tinto's theory into an adult (nontraditional) student persistence theory, positing that adult students are not as concerned about the social environment of an institution, but are more focused on the academic program. While campus students look to peers and faculty for support, commuting adult students rely on networks outside of the institution (Bean & Metzner, 1985; Bean, 1990).

The increased availability of online learning has raised the specter of student attrition even higher. Online learning is certainly a convenient way to educate people, but it has suffered from a number of problems and concerns. Among these is the high rate of student attrition, measured as a decrease in the number of enrolled students (Yukselturk & Inan, 2006; O'Brien & Renner, 2002; Oblender, 2002). Because of the apparently high dropout rates in online education, a significant amount of research has been conducted on attrition in online courses. Morgan and Tam (1999) argue that three main approaches have been taken in try-

ing to uncover and understand the reasons for student attrition in distance education. One approach predicts dropout by looking at student characteristics such as age, gender, employment status, and previous education (Belawati, 1998; Parker, 1999; Xenos, Pierrakeas, & Pintelas, 2002; Pierrakeas, Xenos, Panagiotakopoulos, & Vergidis, 2004). The second approach examines the features and format of the courses that possibly affect student dropouts (Woodley & Parlett, 1983; Garland, 1993; Frankola, 2001; Fozdar, Kumar, & Kannan, 2006). Finally, "the third approach to the explanation of drop-out is to ask the students themselves for the reasons behind their decision" (Morgan & Tam, 1999, p.99). This approach has been effective in determining reasons for student attrition in a number of studies (Boshier, 1973; Cross, 1981; Parker, 1999; Xenos, Pierrakeas, & Pintelas, 2002; Vergidis & Panagiotakopoulos, 2002; Rausch, Cordero, & Usleston, 2003).

Morgan and Tam (1999) assess the research and determine four categories of persistence barriers. Situational barriers are changes in a student's life circumstances. Institutional barriers are difficulties with the institution and can include admission requirements, course pacing, and student support. Student characteristics such as attitude and motivation form the dispositional barriers. Epistemological barriers are those that stem from the course material and contents (Morgan & Tam 1999).

Rovai (2003) builds a model of online student persistence combining the Tinto (1975) and the Bean and Metzner (1985) models. Rovai argues that his composite model offers a more complete explanation of why adult students stay in an online course or program. His model adds to the previous models by including measures of the skills needed by online students (Cole, 2000; Rowntree, 1995), the unique needs of distance education students (Workman & Stenard, 1996), and the need to align teaching and learning styles (Grow, 1996). According to Rovai (2003), student persistence "results from the interaction of student characteristics and skills prior to admission and external and internal factors affecting students after admission (Patterson, 2007, p. 29).

Rausch, Cordero, and Usleston (2003) identify an attitudinal component as a significant explanation for student attrition in online classes. The researchers find that students who are "actively engaged" in their courses are more likely to complete the course. The present research builds on this study by considering the role of active engagement in the decision-making process of students in both the online and traditional face-to-face environments. The hypothesis that actively engaged students are

more likely to complete a core curriculum course as well as earn a better grade is tested using data collected from a survey of students in core courses.

The Student Survey

A survey of students in History 1301 (United States History I) and 1302 (United States History II) and Political Science 2305 (American National Government) and 2306 (American State and Local Government) was conducted in two waves during the Spring and Fall semesters in 2007. In the first wave, students who dropped the identified courses from the 12th class day through the last day to drop a course were contacted by email and provided with a link to the survey instrument. Students who completed the courses were contacted at the end of the semester and asked to complete the survey. The 20-question survey instrument that formed the core of the survey was drawn from Wallace and Clariana (2000). The survey questions appear in the appendix. The surveys for both groups were identical except that the students who dropped were asked to respond to an open-ended question: Why did you drop the course? Students who completed the course were asked to comment on any special strategies they used in completing the course.

The survey was sent to 139 students in both semesters who dropped one of the four courses under examination. The response rate for the students who dropped one of the courses was 8.6%. The population of dropouts does not include those who withdrew completely from the university as these students probably had different reasons for withdrawing. After the initial email message and two reminder emails, 12 students responded. The response rate is one indicator of why it is difficult to study students who drop courses: they are difficult to reach. The response rate for completers was 8.2% with surveys sent to 3,163 students in both semesters.

The four courses were selected because they form part of the core curriculum determined by state law. Texas Education Code § 51.301 specifies:

Every college and university receiving state support or state aid from public funds shall give a course of instruction in government or political science which includes consideration of the Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the states, with special emphasis on that of Texas. This course shall have a credit value of not less than six semester hours or its equivalent.

The history requirement outlined by the Texas Education Code § 51.302 is not as specific:

A college or university receiving state support or state aid from public funds may not grant a baccalaureate degree or a lesser degree or academic certificate to any person unless the person has credit for six semester hours or its equivalent in American History. A student is entitled to submit as much as three semester hours of credit or its equivalent in Texas History in partial satisfaction of this requirement.

The courses were also offered in the same department, the Department of History, Political Science, and Criminal Justice, in spring 2007, although by the Fall 2007 semester, the departments had been separated into the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice and the Department of History and Geography. Finally, the four courses examined in the present research are most likely to include material students encountered in high school, thus provoking the comment, "I learned all this in high school."

Measures

Drop or Complete Course?

The dependent variable in this study is whether or not the student dropped or completed the core course. The data were collected using two different surveys. Students who dropped the course and filled out the "dropped" questionnaire were coded as 1 for dropped. The students who finished the course were coded 0 for not dropped. This dichotomous variable will serve as the dependent variable in the logistic regression analysis presented later.

Active Engagement

Twenty questions drawn from Wallace and Clariana (2000) formed the core of the survey instrument completed by those students who dropped one of the courses as well as those students who completed one of the courses. Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement on a 5-point scale. Subjecting the data to a principal components factor analysis yielded six factors. One of the factors, labeled "Active Engagement" is composed of the following statements:

- This course actively engaged me.
- Overall, I considered this to be a high-quality course.
- This course was boring. [Reversed in index]
- Many of the course activities seem useless. [Reversed in index]

- Course assignments were interesting.
- The course assignments are appropriate.
- This course "turned me on!"

Responses to the statements were summed, producing an index of Active Engagement for each respondent. The index has a Cronbach's alpha of .925. The index ranges from 7 to 35, with a higher score indicating a greater sense of engagement.

The other five factors are not considered here.

Other Variables

Respondents were queried about other course-related and demographic information. They had to indicate which of the four courses they dropped or completed. They were asked if the course was taught online or in a traditional face-to-face format. Respondents who completed the course were asked to specify their semester letter grade. Demographic variables include gender and age.

Why Students Drop Core Courses

The twelve responses to the question "Why did you drop this course?" fall into the four categories of persistence barriers recognized by Morgan and Tam (1999).

Situational

- I missed to [sic] much class for medical reasons and did not think that I could pull it out.
- Just had too much stuff going on at one time.
- I did not have time.
- I over loaded myself this semester and that was the class that I was the most behind in.

Dispositional

- Too time consuming with little relevance.
- It was too much reading and I am taking chemo therapy.
- It was too much reading in one week and was very difficult exams. I just couldn't keep up.

Institutional

- Dr. Professor is a complete freak. His/her teaching ability is not as high as it should be for this University. He/she taught useless points about COURSE. He/she also had the image of "I'm better than you and I don't care if you fail my class or not!"
- Because the teacher was awful. I never knew what to study for on the tests. He/she would tell us one thing and then that material wouldn't even be on there.

Epistemological

- Assignments were lengthy and required more time than I had to fulfill them. It was taking me at least 5-6 hours a night to complete my homework for the week. Also, scores on quizzes were only counted if you made a 100, therefore that required more time in taking them more than once. Textbook was hard to follow. I even had my husband, who is an engineer and a COURSE buff, help me with some questions from the book and he could not figure them out either.
- Because the instructor basically said if you can not handle it than [sic] drop the class. He/she wanted the students to be studying COURSE it seemed like 24 hours a day. The test were hard you had to take them until you made a 100% on them. Than the groups that you were in at least my group members never emailed me to [get] together on the group assignments.
- I dropped the class because I felt that the instructor wanted to [sic] much of his/her students. I couldn't keep up with the course work. Vary rarely did I get feedback from my instructor. I talked with his/her assistant more than anything.

The data were further subjected to a series of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests examining the relation between a number of the variables and scores on the Active Engagement index. The findings are instructive but not surprising. Students who dropped a course reported significantly lower Active Engagement scores. The mean score for students who dropped is 16.92, while the completers reported a mean score of 24.49 ($F=17.310$; $p=.0001$).

An examination of the index by grade reveals the following:

A:	26.61
B:	24.49
C:	20.54
DFW (combined because of small numbers):	19.61

The F is 17.40 ($p=.0001$). A post hoc test revealed that the largest significant difference is between the C mean and the mean for the DFW students.

Students in online sections reported higher levels of active engagement. The mean score for the online students is 25.40 while the traditional face-to-face students reported a mean of 23.26 ($F=6.61$; $p=.011$).

Finally, the differences in reported active engagement between the four courses examined was not statistically significant:

Table 1. Determinants of Whether a Student Dropped the Course.

	Estimated logit coefficients (standard errors)
Active Engagement	-.187 [*] (.050)
Age	.053 (.034)
Gender	-.358 (.719)
Summary statistics	
Number of cases	269
-2 Log Likelihood	78.165
Chi-square	16.394 (3df)
Nagelkerke R ²	.204

^{*}=significant at 0.05 level in a two-tailed test

History 1301: 25.17

History 1302: 23.67

Political Science 2305: 23.80

Political Science 2306: 23.91

The reported F is .634 ($p=.594$).

The table displays the results of a logistic regression analysis. Any findings presented here must be considered in light of the fact that only 12 students who dropped the courses under examination responded to the survey. Overall, the model predicts course-dropping behavior reasonably well, with a Nagelkerke R^2 of .204. In addition, 95.3% of the cases are classified correctly. The most striking finding presented in the table is the strength of a student's perceived active engagement in predicting whether a student will drop a course. Recall that a student who dropped a course is coded as 1 and staying the course is coded 0. For this reason the coefficient is negative. One could argue that a student who feels more engaged in the course is less likely to drop it, a finding in line with the ANOVA analyses presented above. No other variables exhibited a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable.

Discussion and Conclusions

This essay reports on research into the reasons why students drop core courses. While it does not present definitive reasons, the evidence collected here suggests that students who feel actively engaged in their courses are less likely to drop them. This finding should not be

surprising, although it is significant that the survey data analyzed here illustrate this relationship.

The findings reported here, although limited, offer some direction in the search for approaches to retaining students: students are more successful in courses that actively engage them. Interestingly, it appears as though the online sections of the four courses examined in this essay were significantly more engaging than the traditional face-to-face sections. One place we should look for guidance is the online sections. What techniques do the instructors of the online sections use to teach their courses? Could these techniques be adopted in some manner in the face-to-face sections of the same courses?

Of course, the research method employed here did not allow for a measurement of engagement until either the student dropped the course or the course was completed. Completing students were not sent the survey until after many of them had already seen their grades. It is possible that the Active Engagement index is not measuring the actual level of engagement in the course as it is measuring satisfaction with the grade. Additional examination is required in order to more fully understand the role of perceived engagement in attrition decisions.

Future directions for this research involve the inclusion of different courses over several semesters. For example, math courses experience high levels of attrition as well as low grades awarded to students who complete the courses. How do the active engagement measurements differ between the history or political science courses analyzed here compare to the scores of students in math courses? It may be possible to administer the survey at different points in a semester to determine who engaged

students were in the subject matter before taking the course and at various milestones in the semester.

The model presented in this essay is admittedly underspecified. Additional analysis will be necessary to find additional explanatory variables in order to produce a more robust predictive model of attrition behavior.

The important issue to remember is that none of the students who dropped a course reported that they dropped because they already learned "all this in high school." Most dropped for the reasons identified in previous research. It is possible that while many students

recognize similar course content from high school, the content is being taught in a more engaging way. Now we are challenged to find that engaging teaching method to keep students from dropping core courses.

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Appendix

Survey Questions

Scale is 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree)

1. Course assignments were interesting.
2. I learn best without supervision.
3. I prefer tough courses that really challenge me.
4. Many of the course activities seem useless.
5. I am a self-starter.
6. I always try to outperform other students.
7. The course assignments are appropriate.
8. I usually prepare for exams well in advance.
9. I make sure that other students get my viewpoint.
10. The course was boring.
11. I prefer constant feedback from the teacher.
12. My views contribute little to the quality of the course.
13. I work harder than others to stand out from the crowd.
14. I don't care how others are doing on assignments.
15. I work best under a deadline.
16. This course actively engaged me.
17. Overall, I considered this to be a high quality course.
18. I am usually competitive.
19. I prefer to do assignments my way.
20. This course "turned me on!"

Source: Wallace and Clariana (2000)

Cosmopolitan Patriotism

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ABSTRACT: *What is the value of patriotism in a globalized world? As the global increasingly penetrates the local and vice versa, our education and socialization strategies need to prepare future generations to think on multiple levels. This facility is especially necessary if the competing interests and institutions that work in and across states are to be made substantively accountable. This essay places into conversation cosmopolitanism and patriotism and argues that not only can cosmopolitans be patriotic, but also that patriotism must be reconceived with a cosmopolitan spirit. The essay also argues that the state must be the focus of political action, and that focus must be multifaceted, being cognizant of the state as a transnational process that operates on multiple levels and directions in particular contexts but also in the world beyond. Patriotism therefore must take the form of a love for something that is acknowledged to be not static, constantly moving and reforming. Cosmopolitanism is important for conceiving attachments to such a mercurial thing because it is itself a dynamic form of solidarity.*

With the re-emergence in political theory of cosmopolitanism as an alternative catalyst for progressive politics, there tended to be an apologetic tone that accompanied its endorsement. Theories of cosmopolitanism are often expressed tentatively or defensively in contrast to nationalism or patriotism as if the latter are givens (Mehta, 2000; Waldron, 2000; Köhler, 1997; Meinecke, 1970). And when conceived in morally legitimate terms, nationalism and patriotism appear inherently beneficial in ways, it is argued, the upstart cosmopolitanism could never hope to be (Hill, 2000; Himmelfarb, 1996; Mansfield, 1994). This essay places into conversation the purportedly contradictory grounds for solidarity in cosmopolitanism and patriotism to argue that not only can cosmopolitans be patriotic, but that today patriotism must be conceived with a cosmopolitan ethos. This imperative certainly obtains for progressive politics, but in our global context, conservatism must also take heed.

Historically much abused, cosmopolitanism's resurgence has in part been the result of an increasingly interdependent world and the exasperation with neoliberal and socialist internationalisms by those seeking to articulate social justice imperatives in a globalizing context. To be sure, the ideal is both old and a newcomer to the scene, and it has always faced the question—in Aristotle's terms—that if the definition of a human as such is a being belonging to a specific polis of some kind, what kind of creature belongs to a cosmic polis or a general polis of all rational beings? What is reason or *logos* for such creatures? Thus, in Anderson's (1991) more recent formulation, if a nation is a kind of polis or community that

perceives itself as sharing a common fate—a particular shared history and set of tangible historical practices—then what is it to belong to a polis that does not necessarily share these concrete characteristics? Indeed, the cosmopolis is conceived as timeless and placeless.¹ However, membership in the cosmopolis today is determined by those faculties that allow humans to seek justice and to live simultaneously in individual and species being in the face of dehumanizing global capitalist and fundamentalist religious forces (Commissiong, 2011). Over the last century, a potential concrete community seems to be emerging on a global scale in ways that Aristotle could not foresee or possibly comprehend (Beck, 2006; Held, 1995). As a consequence of technological innovations in communication and travel, that potential, global community can be entered into by mere assent and attitude or practice without having to change location.

In part, these distinctions mark the ancient world off from the modern, but they also begin to underscore the differences between what cosmopolitan conceptions of community and patriotic or nationalistic versions offer. These conceptions and practices of community share an associative character that mark them all as forms of human togetherness. As such, this essay teases out the related strands to demonstrate a stronger, more just patriotism, and how the concrete allegiances the cosmopolitan ethos demands can shape it. The challenge here is in part to show the potential of the community of cosmopolitan belonging and how it positively affects patriotism's particular strengths and weaknesses. Conversely, patriotism may have something to say to the cosmopolitan association as well.

Two concerns must be addressed from the outset. First, cosmopolitanism does not seek to destroy the positive aspects of local, particular bonds that patriotism can possess.² From its beginning, cosmopolitanism acknowledged that we do belong to a local, physical polis of some kind (Schofield, 1991). Even so, it always insisted that we belong to a cosmo-polis as well. Second, our increasingly interdependent global age has developed shared practices and experiences, albeit mediated through forms of corporate-controlled connections or made possible through not-always affordable rapid travel. I highlight the economic aspects of these media primarily to underscore the limitations on their availability, and because the media affect the message.³ That is, while many of these communicative media and transit routes are increasingly ubiquitous, they still do not extend to everyone. Moreover, they are subject to state and corporate interventions and limitations. As such, there is much ground to cover if, as is the purpose of this essay, one means to show how cosmopolitanism can be patriotic. In order to avoid the craven currents that often permeate discussions of patriotism and cosmopolitanism, the intent is to make patriotism more cosmopolitan.

The following first puts into context past and present political arenas to diagnose the special challenges faced by contemporary political communities. Then, I turn to the question of sovereignty and its shortcomings. The final section fleshes out solutions to these new challenges to political solidarity in a global context that cosmopolitanism can help us comprehend.

Politics ancient and modern (community right and individual right)

Our contemporary world has been shaped as much by recent technological and economic innovations as it has by its inheritances from the past. Chief among these developments is the indisputably interconnected nature of our existence today. Although nation states may have more recent origins, nations are longstanding collectivities of fiction and fact (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1991). They are shaped by realities and imaginaries of humans being together. When cosmopolitanism was first articulated in the ancient Greek city at its high point, the city was a small, intimate community of men. And while not all interests were the same—often resulting in violent clashes between individuals and groups (Morris, 1996)—that society was far more homogenous than today’s national and globally transnational communities. Aristotle (1995)

argued that human beings as such could only exist in a polis of some kind, for it was the only means by which political beings and community could develop toward their fullest, most complex forms. The polis embodies the shared experiences and history that shape the moral and political horizon of action and affection that determine the constellation of expectations and limitations against which individuals could excel before their fellows and thus strive for immortality in communal memory. Even the iconoclast Socrates, in choosing to take his life rather than leave his city, understood that his existence as a human being was shaped by and dependent upon his relations to his fellow citizens through the process of enacting laws together.

Against this context, the Stoics posed the challenge of a community beyond the physical and conceptual walls of the city. Admittedly, many early Stoics held views either effectively similar to the elitist version of community Aristotle conceived, or, at best, accommodating unequal institutions that existed then, such as slavery and the exclusion of women (Nussbaum, 1994). Thus while Aristotle believed in the rule of the best, some Stoics believed in an exclusive community of rational beings. This formulation was only slightly more compatible with the modern cosmopolitan ethos because these later Hellenistic cosmopolitans, unlike their fellow Greeks generally, understood this potential community of rational beings to be universal and inclusive of women, foreigners, and slaves. Additionally, the way the Roman Stoics later took up these ideas in, for example, Marcus Aurelius’ sincere cosmopolitanism, it could scarcely have been of comfort to those he conquered. I raise these issues not to condemn early cosmopolitanisms per se, but rather to highlight how much the ideal has changed, for the germ of the idea they shared evolved into something more.

These changes occurred over several centuries. Greek cosmopolitanism fed into, altered, and was altered by ideas from Rome and Western monotheisms to become a set of natural law ideals concerning universal interaction and human rights (d’Entrèves, 1996; Ishay, 2004). As Pauline Kleingeld (1999) shows, by the eighteenth century in Germany, the ideal had crystallized in the modern context into at least six different varieties: economic, political, moral, cultural, romantic, legal and international cosmopolitanisms. Through the tumultuous period of Western democratization and nation-state formation culminating in the horrors of the twentieth century’s wars and genocides, cosmopolitanism in response coalesced further around three groupings: the moral-political-legal variety, the cultural-romantic variety, and the economic-

international-cultural variety (Commissiong, 2011). What can be identified in each of these as authentically “cosmopolitan” will not be elaborated here, as the distinctions are largely, but not entirely, unimportant for this essay. Rather, the purpose of this brief account is to illustrate that, like other ideals inherited from the past such as patriotism, cosmopolitanism has also changed over time, reflecting particular conditions and challenges while retaining core sets of principles.

Stoics and their cosmopolitan descendants claimed a noumenal connection through logos to other human beings outside the bounded community, but this intangible claim was easily ignored. The phenomenological consequences of our interconnections today, however, have become harder to ignore. Thus, Beck (2006) correctly points out that the “important fact now is that the human condition has itself become cosmopolitan” (p. 1). Only the most militant nationalists today conceive the nation as a static, homogenous community of strictly exclusive, shared existence. Alternatively, while conceiving the nation state as a contractual agreement amongst heterogeneous interests in which the state and its institutions merely play arbitrating roles in achieving justice was present even at the nation state’s formation (Meinecke, 1970; Mill, 1978), only in the last half century have the full implications of this liberal idea come to dominate national discourse, at least in the West. The emergence of robust anti-imperialist, multiculturalist, and pluralist demands located in new social movements, as well as postcolonial struggles, posed new challenges to the shaping of national identity and policy since the middle of the twentieth century. These challenges foregrounded the relation of state to citizens and the unmet demands for popular sovereignty in ever more radical ways. The emergence and legitimacy of these actors’ demands can be said to be the product of what Habermas (1987) has called the ongoing philosophical discourse of modernity—a dialectical unfolding of reason and freedom through material and discursive civil contestation. Alternatively, Honig (2006) and others suggest the battle for human dignity is less the cunning of reason in history as the agility of power and unreason. In practical terms, the broadening demands of recognition and redistribution have in some contexts become more legitimate, even if they are being denied in advanced industrialized, post-industrial, and developing societies alike by a growing chorus of far Right conceptions of corporate and theocratic states.

Another consequence of this broadening of demands is that nationalism and patriotism have been acknowledged by most to be more complex constellations

of the means by which members of modern states interact with and relate to each other and the state. The substantively different economic and social conceptions of the role of the state in arbitrating the resultant conflicts, or, the state’s role in fulfilling its side of the bargain as the monopolizer of the legitimate use of force, has become ever more significant through the role of law (Habermas, 1999; Sandel, 1996). Disagreements over the role of the state resulting from increasing ranges and types of demands have played out in populist and elite movements alike through the legal system. In the last decade in the United States, for example, the rise of the Tea Party represents on the Right an amalgam of populist organizations fueled in part by corporate interests. The far more recent eruptions of Left-wing protests seem in many regards an attempt to present an alternate vision of the responsibilities of government. To be sure, divergent interests like these had always been tied up in the conception and functioning of the state.

The nation state was and is a contest over projected fictions and realities of certain groups who sought to monopolize its institutions (Anderson, 1991). These particular visions of the state sought to simplify the complexity of the community (Scott, 1998; Tilly, 1992) in the image of the hegemon.⁴ This mode of politics today no longer claims complete monopoly on most understandings of the legitimate purpose and makeup of the state even though stalwarts maintain this fiction. The foregrounding of longstanding controversies over immigration; the introduction and now retrenchment of social welfare programs; the responsibility of the state to defend underpowered minorities, women, and the underclass; as well as many other areas all manifest not only the competition for resources and peril in which national and transnational economies place us and themselves, but these conflicts are also intimately caught up in the self-conception of individuals and their political solidarity in and to the state (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). For while neither the Tea Party nor Occupy groups explicitly articulate it, they each have competing understandings not only of the role of the state, which is the most obvious public dispute, but they also possess different visions of the individual’s constitution and her relation to her fellows through the state. Beyond the state, as the politics of human rights itself constrain in whatever limited way how European and North American countries exercise power domestically and in the world beyond, the recognition of and respect for other forms of life for the first time have become at least nominally more important in the machinations of world powers. These new levels of recognition

compound the difficulty in achieving world consensus as divergent agendas, interests, and belief systems enter the fray. For example, it would be stretching this portrait only slightly to argue that despite the variety of languages, cultures, and political forms inside Western Europe, it is the fear for their own security in the face of this great domestic and global diversity, this teeming horde as it were, that drives European states toward stricter protective association. That is to say, any international association Western and other powerful states create may be as much strategic as it is moral-legal. The test of European coordination and cooperation is the challenge that if it is indeed the case that the form of international association that has been developing there and that is again in crisis is predominantly instrumental or worse, reactionary, whether normative voices can be raised in order to affect the just development of current and future institutions. One hopes that since democratic nation-states are in whatever small part contained by legally institutionalized moral imperatives, any intensifying international European association based in law cannot help but incorporate some normative perspective. The need is to make this moral-legal institutionalization more important than the economic or potentially xenophobic ones as sources of solidarity to people these states supposedly represent.

I have been speaking mostly in general terms because these economic and sociocultural crises have shaken all nation-states and all regions, not just the wealthy ones on one side, or the poor or developing ones on the other. To be sure, these crises have played out in different ways in different contexts: from the revolts in predominantly Muslim countries that have toppled governments to the continued uprisings in the West (Kulich, 2011).⁵ Moreover, under the corrosive effects of global recession, less economically developed states have borne the brunt of these challenges. Yet these revolts have not only been on the Left. Indeed, the Tea Party movement in the United States and religious and nationalist fundamentalists there and elsewhere are certainly harbingers of more conservative and Right-libertarian tendencies and intolerant orthodoxies that increasingly seek a legitimating voice in domestic and international public spheres.⁶ In short, both ends of the political spectrum are discontent with current conditions. Significantly, these internal and external challenges are focused on and through the nation state and place pressures on it to a degree it has not seen before precisely because of the expanded conceptual and spatial challenges they represent to the state. Again, it should be noted that these challenges had to lesser degrees always been part of this relatively new entity called

the nation-state. But now, what is at stake is arguably greater than ever before. From environmental catastrophes that are byproducts of industrial production affecting multiple states, to the economic interdependence that variously wreaks havoc and builds up societies, to the increased mobility of human bodies and interests that bring us together and increase the legal and illicit trade in commodities and people, the consequences of missteps due to limited vision have increased exponentially. All of those shared challenges underscore Beck's (2006) observation concerning the inescapably global character of the human condition today. Therefore, in many ways each challenge in our contemporary world has increasing effects much farther beyond the boundaries of a particular state or even region.

Given the challenges of this global interdependence, a number of solutions present themselves. There is of course the withdrawal from global international community. This strategy insists on maintaining territorial and ideational integrity by cleaving ever closer to a limited conception of national sovereignty. This course is more of an option for some states than for others and thus can be implemented more or less successfully by some states than by others. The constant calls in the United States to abandon or abolish the United Nations, the Bush administration's claim to a right to strike first in the so-called war on terror, the current administration's continuation of drone warfare, the slow pace of efforts to salvage the Greek economy by its European partners (and the unnecessarily painful and unproductive economic austerity imposed), all demonstrate only the beginning of a rising acceptance of unilateralism, isolationism and austerity. The alternate vision is one of multilateralism and engagement through the loose array of world political and economic governance structures. This strategy has been variously deployed by world powers with varying degrees of contentiousness and success. For despite the United Nation's clear shortcomings, for example, it is far more consistent with cosmopolitan principles than what came before. On the other hand, the recent austerity measures imposed on European countries, in echoes of past IMF and WTO policies in the developing world, have proven more damaging than helpful (Blyth, 2013; Wolf, 2013).

An alternate tradition of interaction and intercourse developed concurrently with these problematic conceptions and practices of the modern state. Immanuel Kant (1795/1991) famously insisted that international peace could only exist between associations of states with open, republican forms of government. In *Perpetual Peace*, Kant provides three reasons why peace is likely among confed-

erated republican states. These are the relative aversion republican citizens have for war; the pacifying effects of commerce; and the role the public sphere can play in limiting aggression. Not all of these reasons have stood up well to scrutiny over time (Habermas, 1997). Yet the core of his cosmopolitan observation is more pertinent today than ever. Contrary to Kant's expectations, one major weakness of multilateral strategies is those domestic publics who fear the loss of sovereignty, wealth, and the dilution of power. These fears are actually exacerbated by the isolationist approach in the face of a perilous, globally interconnected economy and environment. Moreover, if the multilateral approach does not evolve to incorporate a more substantively cosmopolitan strategy that confronts these ideational and material conditions by strengthening and supporting the democratic component of domestic and international structures already in place, the effectiveness and accountability of these structures will be further diminished. In democratic or republican states, any sustained support and accountability can only truly come from the bottom up. Increasingly when governments try to lead in support of internationalization and economic austerity programs, they are repudiated because the trust of publics has been continuously betrayed (Held & McGrew, 2002a). This is in effect a Catch-22. Domestic publics do not trust global governance structures because they feel no allegiance to them because global institutions have too often failed them. And when global governance structures fail, it is often because governments, seeking to curry favor with corporate interests, financial markets, and even those very publics, do not adequately support them (Held & McGrew, 2002a). To be sure, corporate and financial imperatives became the lingua franca because of the lack of anything approaching consensus on even the basic terms of discourse in the public sphere initially domestically and now internationally as the modern world emerged conceptually from under the sacred canopy of hegemonic religious foundationalism (Hirschman, 1977). The resultant vision of an economic individual or a human driven primarily by self-regarding, cost-benefit economic concerns that grew out of these developments, supplanted the political and social conceptions of the individual from antiquity (Commissioning, 2011; Habermas, 1989). This in turn altered the view of citizens and their relation to each other, to the state, and to the world beyond. Therefore, the understanding of citizenship and patriotic allegiance must be re-imagined in expansive ways in order to meet these transnational economic, environmental, security, and other challenges as well as the broadened framework of politics today. The ex-

panded view of citizenship does not weaken but strengthens the authorizing voice of concretely located local publics because it does not seek to return patriotism and citizenship to an erstwhile context, but rather attempts to address the current globality with the strengths of the two. This means state sovereignty is still important and must be fortified and concurrently made more accountable in broader ways because the state is the principle means of transmitting and amplifying the interests of those publics. In this regard it cannot be stated strongly enough the paramount importance of noting the direction the state has taken in the last 60 years or so has opened it to the charge of dereliction at worst and misjudgment at best in its responsibilities toward its people in favor of global capitalist and corporate interests (Commissioning, 2011; Harvey, 2005). However, this means citizenship and patriotism must also be reconceived and strengthened against corporatization of both in order that the humanist interests of the people and the civic state may be more fully realized. This can only come from a cosmopolitan patriotism. The reconception of citizenship in this transnational way allows people to negotiate better the tensions between global and local belongings and responsibilities.

Sovereignty Re-imagined, Citizenship Expanded

Certainly tensions exist between cosmopolitanism and patriotism, but these tensions do not render them incompatible. As Kok-Chor Tan (2010) suggests, "a cosmopolitan theory that cannot accommodate certain forms of associative ties that characterize the lives of individuals, including the ties of nationality, is *prima facie* implausible" (p. 177). These tensions ultimately can prove productive if each side engages the other constructively. Indeed, the critical aspect of modern cosmopolitan conceptions of the human and politics is the dynamic character of the subject that is able to engage its political and social connections in terms of principle as well as interest (Commissioning, 2011). The Stoic cosmopolitan ideal insisted, in the terms of Hierocles's well-known metaphor, that we exist in concentric circles of allegiance that must be drawn in closer to the center. The circles of allegiance of individuals in a community always overlapped, and now such interrelations undeniably extend to fellow inhabitants of our planet. The implication of this metaphor is that even though a cosmopolitan patriotism insists identity and allegiance are dynamic and mutable, it accepts that they are also not meaningless. The individual at the center of those

circles has real, sometimes unconscious investments in them, for the individual is the anchor that holds together a variety of experiences and commitments to particular interpretations of the world and her connections to them. But while those relations can often be unconscious or taken as a given, the individual is also able to be conscious of those connections and judge them according to moral conception of beings in similar conditions. While the realization of similar conditions may not be related directly to similar experiences, the point here is that other individuals live with their own set of circles of allegiance. In a community of shared fate, one of those outer circles of belonging is certainly the state. Thus members of a political community share at least one circle of allegiance in the state, even if they may disagree about its contours.

As the preceding section suggested, the challenges to the nation state today require thinking about national identity and patriotism to be inflected with more planetary perspectives. To begin, we should remind ourselves that if the ideal cosmopolitan community can be criticized because it is entered into by mere assent, it must also be acknowledged that the particular national community is entered into by accident of birth. Thus the advantage of associational integrity the material state has over the cosmopolitan community diminishes on the grounds of the moral arbitrariness and contingency of that particular association. Even so, most modern cosmopolitan formulations accept, at least in principle, the significance and integrity of the concrete association. There has been some give on the other side as well. For example, in states that operate predominantly under the principle of *jus sanguinis*, naturalization barriers have certainly become less restrictive. Still, for those who are unable to travel and change their unfavorable location, cosmopolitanism insists we ask why the “birthright lottery” condemns some to poverty, limited possibilities, and death because of the accident of where we are born. This question extends the already highly contentious domestic demands for redistribution and recognition beyond the state. In truth, these demands have always been present, albeit in much more muted ways or with far less concrete possibilities of realization. What responsibilities the state and its members have to each other are set in stark relief against the larger questions of responsibilities of states and human beings to other human beings outside the political body. What then motivates action in each of these domains?

Broadly speaking, there are two communal determinants of action: the legal-institutional and the affective. An additional, extra-communal determinant are meta-physical rules, which indicates right action in the abstract,

but has no concrete effect until it is realized through the legal-institutional order motivates action in less tangible ways. The legal-institutional determinant of action is empirical in the sense that institutions, acting on at most nominal legal grounds, can and do physically enforce their will. The affective determinants are less empirical, even though they are arguably more effective since affective determinants can influence and have access to individuals on a personal, subjective level—in communities, in families, and in the subject’s interior being—in ways that the legal-institutional influencers might not. Part of the resistance to globalization that connects the two poles of the political spectrum is the justified suspicion that economic globalization undermines both legal-institutional and affective determinants and thus the will of the people by loosening the affective bonds that reinforce the process of will formation and expression that render legitimacy to the state. Sovereignty in the modern era was tied up in democratic right and will formation. If the People is theoretically sovereign, as claimed in most struggles of modern state formation and foundation, that means the destabilizing of sovereignty that economic globalization produces destabilizes both democratic will itself and its ability to affect or authorize the state’s actions. Additionally, if we might appropriate and democratize the French king’s formula and maintain that the State is the People, globalization’s effect on sovereignty destabilizes the integrity of the patriotic bands of the People as well. Of course, in practical terms, the sovereignty that globalization destabilizes is first and foremost the sovereignty of the governing apparatus, since in modern states, it is governments that represent and actualize through mediated processes the People’s will. Therefore, the absolutely well placed suspicion of globalization and its ancillary transnational processes taints cosmopolitanism as well because there has been a poor job done in distinguishing cosmopolitanism from globalization. This effect makes nationalists out of conservatives and progressives in the debate over the role of the state. That nationalism is certainly expressed in various ways, but it is fundamentally isolationist in its result. It makes little difference if on the one hand the demand is for work for our workers, or the withdrawal from international forums, the effect is still the same: a pulling back from the global arena of exchange.

The neoliberal international order, in which private property, capital flows, and sometimes forced movements of peoples, is driven by a consumptive worldview. It is consumptive in the sense that it is driven forward by capital accumulation fed by production and consumption. It is also consumptive in the sense that it overrides

all local practices, worldviews, and histories that it cannot make compatible or profitable with itself. It is for this reason that it is essentially misleading to call globalization Westernization. For even in the West, forms of life that are incompatible with modernization and globalization have been wiped out or are in mortal combat with them (Sassen, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; Weber, 1976). Indeed, it makes more sense to conflate modernization and globalization, because both have at their core a highly materialist image of the world. It is true that in Western Europe, the clash between empiricism and idealism reached several tentative stalemates (between Mill and Marx, and between capitalism and socialism, for example). But in truth, as a function of the Anglophone dominance of world arenas, the materialist strain in liberalism pioneered by Locke and carried forward by Mill now dominates.

It has long been time when we must rethink the principles that underlie global expansion in light of what we know of its many negative and positive effects (Held & McGrew, 2002b; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002). Ulrich Beck (1998) has argued that, “[a]ny attempt to create a new sense of social cohesion has to start from the recognition that individualisation, diversity and scepticism are written into our culture.” Beck suggests that our radical, institutional individualism means that we are freed from the bonds and baggage of community. Even so, we must admit

living alone means living socially. . . . How can a secular society exposed to the rigours of the global market, based on an institutionalised individualism, in the midst of a global communications explosion, also foster a sense of belonging, trust and cohesion? Only through political freedom: a source of cohesion, one which is not exhausted by daily use but only flows stronger. (Beck, 1998, p. 28)

What this freedom produces in us is a feeling that values are being lost. But in fact what is occurring is not really the loss of values, but the transvaluation of the old set of values into the new “in which the hierarchical certainty of ontological differences is displaced by the creative uncertainty of freedom” (Beck, 1998, pp. 28–29). But almost immediately Beck asks, while all this freedom is impressive, what are the “side effects” of globalization?

One such side effect is a new kind of imperialism in which weak states are subordinated to institutions of “global governance.” Another is the double standard of global morality. In the age of globalization, there is no easy escape from this democratic dilemma. The central problem is that without a politically strong cosmopolitan

consciousness and corresponding institutions of global civil society and public opinion, cosmopolitan democracy remains, for all the institutional ideals, no more than a regulative utopia. The decisive question is whether and how a consciousness of specifically cosmopolitan—as opposed to a general—global solidarity can develop. Acknowledging interconnectedness is part of perceiving the world in global terms, and as I have been arguing, this is becoming harder and harder to deny. But the question of what to do about that interconnectedness is the purview of a cosmopolitan sensibility and politics.

According to Beck, what we are left with is a situation in which the dominant corporatism already seeks to fulfill its interests on a global scale, while the citizen still identifies herself in ways proscribed by the state. This is so despite the fact that those forces that affect the life of the citizen are both local and global in origin and scope. Clive Thomas (2000) notes that globalization is a process driven by the glib assurances and confidence in market forces and actors. Taking this observation into account, this I turn next to the cosmopolitan ideal’s demands for global, mutually beneficial outcomes and institutions. In addition, the solution to the confrontation between negative universalism and negative fundamentalism is not necessarily more democracy alone, rather, it should be action determined by a cosmopolitan democracy. Democratic nationalism only reinforces the same tribalism with bigger players by setting a field of interaction with unequal players.

Practicing Political Solidarities in a Modern, Globalized World

Humans live in various ways across the globe. Generally speaking, the variety may be conceived in terms of a range from those that emphasize the individual more to others that place primacy in the community. The various kinds of states are not always commensurable and often conflict based in these emphases. Even within the same political, social, economic, cultural or even familial context, different positions often emerge. Most intriguing of all is the conflicting drives within the smallest unit of political analysis: the individual. The world of human affairs stretches from this microscopic point of personal competing imperatives and desires to the macroscopic plain of interstate dealings. Any conception of human political practice rooted in respect for this human variety cannot seek to overcome it. Rather, the question before us centers on what ways we can find to live in peace and prosperity in

light of it. This is the question that any substantive cosmopolitanism must attempt to illuminate, if not answer.

Cosmopolitanism insists that we owe our fellow human beings some moral and, therefore, practical duties no matter where they live. In terms of analysis, these duties can be described in theoretical and practical terms. Since duties that are moral-theoretical do not appear in the world empirically unless they are realized through actions or institutions, they must somehow be translated into material effects if we intend for our moral determinations or feelings of solidarity to have concrete consequence. This means that our actions in the world have to be focused on actual material conditions; these material conditions may run the gamut from the embodied existence of people and our direct interactions with each other to the political and public sphere institutions in and through which we live our lives together. Thus our concerns and the empirical structures through which we act in our attempt to realize ideals, have to be the most proximate institutions through which we may realize our moral concerns or solidarity. This is none other than the state⁷ in which we find ourselves. As Kant maintained, the republican nation-state form is the best model so far imagined to accommodate the dignity of human freedom and the need for coordination of those free individuals. Although it is also true of other forms of the state, the republican state is the most proximate and powerful political institution through which we may be able to act in the world. A state is not necessarily the most powerful entity in the world at any given moment, but it is certainly in its republican form the most powerful entity over which a populace has any semblance of control, at least in principle. This is because it is a type of political entity, subject to the raucousness of the agon. Since this state is the one in which we find ourselves, the one through which we may be able to act in the world to realize moral ends, if it is a free republic, I ought to have some respect for it, even if I might not respect those in government or if I believe that freedom is arbitrarily constrained. Since nothing human made in this world is perfect, this respect could well express itself in a want to help to make the state better so that its institutions are better able to translate our moral ideas into practical reality, or at least provide the forum through which competing moral visions may be worked through as peacefully as possible. This is the basis for Kant's (1991) endorsement of republican states in *Perpetual Peace*, and Habermas's (2001) formulation of constitutional patriotism in "Constitutional Democracy." But weariness of the incompleteness or impossibility of the project that Honig points to is an important corrective to help avoid overconfidence. This is especially true in

contexts in which global capital at the same time insulates the state from public accountability and makes it vulnerable to capital's corrosive, anti-political manipulations. A cosmopolitan patriot should work to make her state better, and this is a duty in the Kantian sense when the state is a free republic in which citizens are at least nominally free to participate. In our current, globalized context, making a particular state better includes fortifying not only the political arrangements that increase freedom and responsibility, but also the protection of the state from the ravages of global capital.⁸ The local challenges are also formidable. For it may be true in principle or *de jure* that all citizens may participate, but it might not be possible in a real, *de facto* sense. The political focus for the cosmopolitan, therefore, must first and foremost be the particular state in which she finds herself, rather than some general theoretical state. The proximity of people and institutions, while morally arbitrary, are politically significant. Consequently, the political strategy that a cosmopolitan uses may vary from state to state. The cosmopolitan is constrained by the practical, that is to say, legal limitations of the particular state in which she finds herself.

The state is, in principal, a political entity first and foremost, even though it may be intertwined with, some would say compromised by, economic factors. Cosmopolitan patriotism's central contention is the conscious focusing and foregrounding of the dual allegiance and duties to fellow citizens and the allegiance and duties to fellow human beings that must be negotiated in and through institutions of which the state is ultimately the most politically significant. There is no specific outcome claimed here in the recommendation of this refocusing. Rather, the purpose of recognizing and emphasizing these multiple allegiances is to move the conversation away from us *versus* them conceptions of nationalist patriotism and more toward an us *and* them conception of cosmopolitan patriotism. There is still recognition of the distinction between groups that this recommendation does not try to erase. Rather, it is an inclusive distinction.

How can this refocusing and inclusive distinction be accomplished? Any normative political strategy that seeks to reframe ingrained practices that shape the way large institutions operate is unlikely to be effective if nothing else because of what can be called social path dependency. The most we can hope for is that we might be able to affect the outlook of succeeding generations. And if education is one of the main crucibles that forms human beings and citizens, then it is there that we must look. Other institutions such as religious organizations and corporate entities are private structures that, in liberal societies, are walled

off from state interference. But it is in public schools among the many public institutions that are key. There certainly are already programs in place that attempt to broaden students' perspectives. These include programs providing access to study abroad opportunities, common readership, guest speakerships, and so on. No matter how much students are exposed through such programs there still remain a sizable contingent who, although they might express vague concerns about human beings in general (partly because they are told it is the right thing to do), could not care less about the specificities of that humanity. It is probably the case that those students who do learn from and express interest in the specifics already have the predisposition to do so and would seek it out anyway or are open to it in their lives. It is those many students who do not who are key.

Education is often highly politicized precisely because those in disagreement over what to teach know full well that one of the major aspects at stake is nothing other than the socialization of the future community. So, a focus on education and succeeding generations is subject to similar although not the same political limitations as changing the establishment outlook and its role in shaping policies toward interstate relations. Even so, there have been many successes with education initiatives such as changes in attitudes toward smoking and driving while under the influence. To be sure, these are broad-based initiatives that are not limited to or necessarily originate in schools. Moreover, they do not necessarily require changing curricula or

altering the way we teach. Still, an "interdependence" component for education curricula at all levels could be incorporated into all types of subjects. Admittedly this relies heavily on instructors already disposed to a global perspective, but arguably, this is precisely what the contestation over diversity and multicultural institutions produced. It is undoubtedly the case that this process is long-term that must be negotiated through public discourse.

The stakes are high. The intended outcome is that kind of citizen that is aware of her civic obligations to her fellow citizens and her human obligations to actual people in the world. This is a citizenship formed as a political and social being who can resist the corporatized subjectivity that clouds humane judgment. Such a citizen would thus be able to demand of her state that it be accountable to her, not to corporations. Although we currently live fully under the mode of the corporatized state, it is not too late to reverse the trend. But it will require a herculean effort and innovative approaches to achieve this new kind of citizen who is better able to negotiate the demands of global and local membership in human communities. And this development will allow her to demand the same of the state in which she lives.

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Notes

1. Some even criticize it, arguing that if it exists everywhere, then it effectively exists and can exist nowhere. (See Nagel, 1986)
2. Many Cynics and some other schools repudiated the tie to the city entirely. Considering the variety of schools during the Hellenistic period and their cross-pollination, it is undoubtedly the case that some Stoics also shared this deprecating view of the city.
3. They affect the message not only in terms of what gets said but also in terms of who gets to say it and who gets to be in communicative zones.
4. A simple example in the United States might suffice. If we consider the fictions of manifest destiny, of the role of the European in civilizing the vast “untapped” wasteland of the west, we can see how powerful these ideas can be.
5. The demonstrations in Western countries from Greece to the United States over the last decade that registered this social and political discontent are only the most recent eruptions of a set of rejections of the status quo. From the French suburban riots to the anti-globalization protests before them, although all representing different perspectives, still can be marked as being on the opposite side of the political spectrum than the Tea Party in the United States and similar groups elsewhere. Nonetheless, the discontent with the state on all sides is something real. It is the diagnosis of the problem and the solutions that are different.
6. In the United States, the marginalization of the irrational Right by other, mainstream conservatives had been until recently an effective stopgap and such populist rage.
7. By “state” I of course mean all levels of the institutionalized political sphere. This may include municipal agencies and national ones as well. In the small number of existing federal systems, this means the federal and local levels.

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“The Response”: A Day of Prayer and Protest

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ABSTRACT: *This study examines two unique groups in the United States: participators and protestors of a religious event held in Houston, Texas. Texas Governor Rick Perry called upon Christians to come together on August 6, 2011 for a day of prayer and fasting. Survey data were gathered from participants and protestors of “The Response.” Differences in values, psychological sense of global community, political conservatism, and social dominance orientation (SDO) were examined. Participators placed greater importance on conservation and self-enhancement values and were more conservative and higher in SDO than protestors. Protestors placed greater importance on self-transcendence values. Moreover, protestors scored higher on psychological sense of global community, indicating greater perceptions of belonging to a global community consisting of all of humanity. Respondents also rated the importance of current issues facing the United States. Participators placed significantly greater importance on economic and conservative concerns. Protestors placed significantly greater importance on social justice issues. This essay discusses significant and noteworthy differences in terms of the motivations for social change.*

In the United States, political parties struggle to encourage citizens to get involved and advocate for change essential to their particular vision for society. The intergroup dynamics of the two dominant political parties have placed politics in the United States in a contentious state. Red and blue states and conservative and liberal are terms used to describe the ideological divide that exists in the United States today. This division is seen not only among elected officials, but also among the public as new social movements develop across the country. For instance, the Tea Party emerged in 2009 as a voice advocating for conservative reform. Members of the Tea Party, frustrated by the bailouts initiated under George W. Bush’s administration and the stimulus package passed during the beginning of Barack Obama’s administration, perceived the federal government as fiscally irresponsible in its handling of bank bailouts and takeover of private industry. During the 2010 Congressional elections, 109 Republican challengers were, in some way, associated with the Tea Party movement (Jacobson, 2011). In contrast, Occupy Wall Street is a liberal movement fighting the power of banks and multinational corporations in the democratic process. Members of the Occupy movement express concerns over the ability of banks and corporations to influence public policy and the simultaneous loss of the average U.S. citizen’s ability to influence government and impact policy decisions. Both the Tea Party and the Occupy movement claim to be grassroots organizations powered by the concerns of U.S. citizens.

The ideological schism defining politics in the United States today was recently on display in Houston, Texas. Rick Perry, the Governor of Texas and, at one point, a potential 2012 Presidential candidate for the Republican Party, called upon Christians from across the country to come together on August 6, 2011 for a day of prayer and fasting. The event, referred to as “The Response,” aimed to bring God’s help to a “nation in crisis.” The Mississippi-based American Family Association (AFA), a Christian nonprofit organization best known for its strong opposition to homosexuality, provided funding for the event. Three days before the event, organizers indicated 8,000 people were registered to attend (Acosta, 2011). The day of the event, however, brought out nearly 30,000 people (Montgomery, 2011). In addition to the participants, an estimated 300 protestors countered the controversial gathering (Gerlich, 2011). Protestors of “The Response” voiced opposition to the AFA, the exclusionary focus on Christianity, and the blatant merging of religion and politics. Participators downplayed the role of politics and claimed the day was focused on prayer and saving the United States. This study surveyed two key groups: those who participated in the event and those who protested the event. The essay focuses on distinctions between these two specific groups by examining differences in personal values, perceptions of belonging to a global community consisting of all humanity, political conservatism and social dominance orientation (SDO), and differences in the key issues perceived to be pressing concerns for the United States. This research is a real-world

application of several prominent, theoretical approaches in social psychology to a very intense and complex intergroup situation.

Values

According to Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov (2011), values are “cognitive representations of desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or group” (p. 538). This view starts with the premise that values are based on a set of universal human needs or motivations. Schwartz (1992) has identified ten value types, each representing basic human motivations and goals:

- . self-direction (independent thought and action)
- . stimulation (excitement, novelty, and challenge in life)
- . hedonism (pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself)
- . achievement (personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards)
- . power (social status and prestige and control or dominance over people and resources)
- . security (safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self)
- . conformity (restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms)
- . tradition (respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self)
- . benevolence (preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent, personal contact)
- . universalism (understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature)

Within these value types, individual values (e.g., equality, social justice) derive meaning from the motivations they represent to the individual. For instance, freedom and influence are both self-direction values with the motivation of pursuing independent thought and action.

Prior research has found religiosity to be associated with an acceptance of the social order of society and with discouraging openness and questioning about the world (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). Moreover, religiosity has been associated with a greater concern for the welfare of others with whom frequent contact occurs. In contrast, religiosity is associated with less universalism, or being less concerned with the welfare of all people (Schwartz

& Huismans, 1995; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). Participants of “The Response” would be expected to place greater importance on values stressing the importance of maintaining the status quo (i.e., national security and social order). In addition, due to the nature of the event and the intergroup context of participants and protestors, participants would be expected to place greater emphasis on demonstrating their importance to society (i.e., influence) and values indicating the ability to dominate others (i.e., wealth). In contrast, protestors would be expected to indicate greater concern for the welfare of all people (i.e., equality and social justice) and greater endorsement of independent thought and action (i.e., freedom and creativity).

Religion, Prejudice, and Psychological Sense of Global Community

Social identity theory posits that people who identify with a particular group often hold more favorable attitudes toward ingroup members than outgroup members (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Dovidio and Gaertner (2010) provide a review of the long research tradition in the social sciences examining prejudiced attitudes and intergroup relations. Viewing the ingroup in a more favorable light enhances self-esteem. Moreover, research has also found greater prejudice among religious individuals toward religious outgroup members and non-religious individuals (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999). This prejudice is reflected in both greater ingroup favoritism and more outgroup derogation. “The Response,” highlighted as bringing Christians together, certainly provided a strong basis for group identification among participants. As a result, participants of the event may have experienced greater ingroup favoritism and engaged in derogation of protestors of the event. Interestingly, this call to bring one particular group together to pray for the salvation of a nation may have diminished endorsement of common Christian teachings such as the universality of humanity. This event may have led participants to strongly identify with other Christians, but perhaps attenuated perceptions of belonging to a global community of all humanity.

Psychological sense of community (PSC) includes people’s feelings of belonging, their concern and appreciation for other community members (i.e., that community members matter to each other and to the broader group), and a shared belief that individual needs can and will be met through the community’s commitment to be together (McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Omoto & Malsch, 2005; Omoto & Snyder, 2010). PSC is abstract in nature and extends beyond geographical boundaries

and includes communities organized around common interests, characteristics, experiences, and opinions. Psychological sense of global community (PSGC) is an extension of PSC and considers perceptions of belonging and commitment to a global community that consists of all humanity (Malsch, 2005). PSGC has been associated with greater political and social activism (Hackett & Omoto, 2015) and with greater concern for human rights violations and greater engagement in human rights behaviors (Hackett, Omoto, & Matthews, 2015). The exclusionary focus of this religious gathering may have increased feelings of belonging to a Christian community but likely decreased perceptions and feelings of belonging to a global community of humanity. In contrast, protesting the exclusionary nature of the event may have increased perceptions of belonging to a global community by encouraging protestors to desire a more open and diverse dialogue. As a result, protestors should indicate greater perceptions of belonging to a global community consisting of all humanity than participators of the event.

Political Conservatism and Social Dominance Orientation

Conceptual views of political conservatism have focused on the role of preserving the establishment and opposing change (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). The political nature of the prayer rally allowed for an analysis of the differences in political conservatism between participators and protestors. Recent research has found political conservatism to be associated with greater religiosity (Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt, & Green, 2006; Olson & Green, 2006). Governor Rick Perry (2011), as highlighted in the campaign message below, is a politician who frequently mixes his religious convictions with his political beliefs:

I am not ashamed to admit that I am a Christian. But you don't need to be in the pew every Sunday to know that there is something wrong in this country when gays can serve openly in the military, but our kids can't openly celebrate Christmas or pray in school. As President, I'll end Obama's war on religion, and I'll fight against liberal attacks on our religious heritage. Faith made America strong; it can make her strong again.

Social dominance orientation refers to a desire for group-based dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Group conflict emerges, according to social dominance theory, through both the hierarchy among groups in the social system and the basis for the distinctions made among these

groups. These distinctions can be small or quite large. Stratification in society can be gender-based and based on more arbitrary-set distinctions. The latter distinctions are more arbitrary in nature and vary depending on cultural factors. Groups at the top of the hierarchical system have more material and social power than groups further down the hierarchy. Greater endorsement of group-based dominance characterizes group members closer to the top of these arbitrary systems (Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000). These groups strive to maintain their access to the desired resources available to them because of their higher status.

Religion serves as one possible arbitrary-set distinction among groups. This arbitrary distinction may be particularly salient in the United States, where 73% of the citizenry identifies as Christian (Pew Research Center, 2012). Moreover, during the Presidency of George W. Bush, Christians gained access to greater resources through the faith-based initiatives program. The protestors of this event may be perceived as threatening by the Christian participators. Additionally, the fact that over 30,000 participators attended the event and only around 300 protestors were present may have heightened perceptions of dominance. Previous research has found greater SDO among dominant religious groups, particularly when the status gap between groups is perceived as large (Levin, 2004). Participators of the event should show greater SDO, suggesting perhaps a motivation to preserve the position of Christians in the hierarchical social structure of society in the United States (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).

Current Research

The current research examines several hypotheses set in the context of "The Response."

H1: Participators of "The Response" will place greater importance on the values of national security, social order, influence, and wealth than protestors.

H2: Protestors will place greater importance on the values of equality, social justice, freedom, and creativity than participators.

H3: Protestors will report greater PSGC than participators.

H4: Participators of the event will report greater political conservatism and SDO than protestors.

In addition, in the interest of exploratory investigation, I compare participators and protestors on key issues perceived as important and pressing for the United States. Participators and protestors represent strikingly different ideological perspectives in the United States. As a result,

this data collection represents a unique opportunity to examine exactly on what issues these two groups differ and what issues, if any at all, they both agree are important.

Method

Participants and Design

Data were collected during "The Response." A research team approached participants that had gathered at Reliant Stadium, a large sports stadium in Houston, Texas where the event took place. Among the participants ($N=53$) there were 27 female participants, 21 male participants, and five did not indicate their sex. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 73 with an average age of approximately 40 years old. By self-report, participants were primarily Caucasian (55.8%) with a smaller number of Latinos (21.2%), African Americans (9.6%), Asians (3.8%), and the remainder (9.6%) did not complete this item. The majority of participants, 51.9%, indicated belonging to the Republican Party, 15.4% had no party affiliation, 9.6% were Tea Party members, 7.7% indicated "other," 3.8% were Democrats, one participant belonged to the Independent Party (1.9%), and the remaining 9.6% did not respond.

Data were also collected from people protesting ($N=60$) who remained outside the event (enforced by event security officers). Thirty-one protestors were female, 26 male, and three did not indicate their sex. Protestors ranged in age from 18 to 69 with an average age of approximately 58 years old. For ethnicity, the majority self-reported being Caucasian (63.3%), 11.7% Latino, 11.7% indicated "other," 8.3% African American, 3.3% Native American, and one participant did not complete the item (1.7%). For party affiliation, 30% belonged to the Democratic Party, 28.3% had no party affiliation, 15% were Socialists, 11.7% checked "other," 6.7% Independent Party members, 5% belonged to the Green Party, one participant indicated the Republican Party (1.7%), and one did not complete the item.

Participants were asked if they would be willing to participate in a study examining their personal values and opinions as well as their views on various current issues important to America. Researchers supplied a short booklet containing all of the study materials to those who voluntarily agreed to participate in the survey. Although the research team obtained permission to hand out questionnaires during the rally, recruitment for participants of "The Response" ended sooner than expected when the research team was urged to leave the grounds of Reliant Stadium by event security. The team moved outside

of the grounds and began recruiting protestors. Security measures were in place that prohibited protestors from entering the parking areas of Reliant Stadium. As a result, data recruitment for protestors occurred outside of the area the research team was asked to leave.

Measures

This research was conducted at Reliant Stadium during Governor Rick Perry's prayer rally. As a result, the number of items included for each measure was minimized to make the survey more manageable for participants who were busy participating or protesting the event.

Values. Eight items from the Schwartz Value Survey were included. Using a 7-point scale (1=*not at all important*, 7=*very important*) participants indicated whether the following values are important guiding principles in their lives: equality, freedom, social order, wealth, national security, creativity, influence, and social justice. Greater scores on each item indicate greater agreement with the values.

Political Conservatism. Participants separately rated (1=*very liberal*, 7=*very conservative*) their general political views, their views on social issues, and their views on fiscal issues. These three items showed strong internal consistency ($\alpha=.94$) and were averaged to create a single measure of *Political Conservatism*, with higher scores indicating greater conservatism.

Social Dominance Orientation. Four-items, measured with a 7-point scale (1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*), assessed social dominance orientation: "Some groups are simply not the equal of others;" "Some people are just more worthy than others;" "It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others;" and "If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems in this country" (Pratto et al., 1994). The fourth item was recoded and the items were averaged to create a measure where greater scores indicate greater SDO ($\alpha = .66$).

Psychological Sense of Global Community. Two items from the Sense of Community Index (Chavis, Hogge, McMillan, & Wandersman, 1986) were modified using humanity and global community as the referents. Participants then rated their agreement (1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*) with the items: "I feel a sense of belonging to a human or world community, one that extends beyond where I live and includes more than just people I know" and "I feel a sense of connection to people all over the world, even if I don't know them personally." The items were strongly correlated with one another ($r > .72$, $p < .001$), and were averaged to create a composite

Table 1.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
	<i>Correlations</i>															
(1) Equality	—															
(2) Freedom	.50***	—														
(3) Social Order	.14	.23*	—													
(4) Wealth	-.01	-.01	.31**	—												
(5) National Security	-.10	.14	-.52***	.29**	—											
(6) Creativity	.44***	.50***	.22*	-.01	.14	—										
(7) Influence	.13	.25**	.36***	.25**	.24*	.53***	—									
(8) Social Justice	.46***	.33***	.16	-.06	-.09	.28**	.21*	—								
(9) Political Conservatism	-.22*	.01	.25*	.19*	.62***	-.13	.07	-.39***	—							
(10) SDO	-.34***	-.03	-.03	.06	.29**	-.05	-.06	-.30**	.47***	—						
(11) PSGC	.22*	-.05	.08	-.12	-.20*	.07	.16†	.52***	-.42***	-.54***	—					
(12) Entitlement Reform	.02	.20*	.19†	.15	.35***	.21*	.10	-.06	.39***	.32**	-.24*	—				
(13) Social Justice Issues	.26**	.04	.01	.01	-.13	.08	.13	.47***	-.42***	-.40***	.52***	-.12	—			
(14) War Concerns	-.01	.04	.02	.14	.03	.03	.01	.04	.07	.09	-.14	.14	.13	—		
(15) Conservative Concerns	.06	.19*	.35***	.25**	.56***	.18†	.22*	-.12	.54***	.33***	-.31**	.46***	-.08	.22*	—	
(16) Economic Concerns	.06	.11	.32**	.16	.23**	.09	.25**	-.05	.14	-.16†	.05	.03	.26**	.15	.23*	—
	<i>Descriptions</i>															
All Participants																
M	6.55	6.71	5.49	3.52	5.25	5.81	5.39	6.20	4.69	2.29	5.69	5.12	5.80	5.27	5.12	6.22
SD	1.04	.85	1.72	1.48	1.86	1.32	1.59	1.52	1.52	1.31	1.53	1.76	1.17	1.75	1.35	1.04
n	110	110	108	110	110	110	110	110	109	112	111	110	111	110	111	111
Participants of "The Response"																
M	6.27	6.76	5.96	3.86	6.42	5.78	5.71	5.73	5.67	2.88	5.01	5.83	5.26	5.55	5.88	6.33
(SD)	(1.17)	(.62)	(1.40)	(1.50)	(.94)	(1.29)	(1.35)	(1.82)	(1.31)	(1.30)	(1.63)	(1.30)	(1.24)	(1.50)	(1.06)	(.83)
n	51	51	51	51	52	51	51	51	50	52	51	52	52	52	52	52
Protectors of "The Response"																
M	6.78	6.66	5.07	3.22	4.19	5.83	5.12	6.61	2.24	1.78	6.28	4.48	6.27	5.02	4.46	6.13
(SD)	(.85)	(1.01)	(1.87)	(1.42)	(1.86)	(1.37)	(1.73)	(1.05)	(1.08)	(1.09)	(1.18)	(1.87)	(1.18)	(1.93)	(1.23)	(1.19)
n	59	59	57	59	58	59	59	59	59	60	60	58	59	58	59	59

Note: †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

measure of PSGC with higher scores indicating greater sense of global community.

Current Issues. Participants, again utilizing a 7-point scale (1=*not at all important*, 7=*very important*), indicated the importance of 18 different current issues for America today. The list included: the economy, unemployment, illegal immigration, stem cell research, abortion, gun rights, the Patriot Act, federal deficit, reforming Social Security, reforming Medicare, reforming Medicaid, healthcare reform, war in Iraq, war in Afghanistan, promoting alternative energy sources, racism and prejudice, poverty, and separation of church and state.

An exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation was performed on all eighteen current issues. Five factors emerged with eigenvalues > 1.0. The first factor, all with loadings of .92 and greater, accounted for 24.14% of the common variance in the items, and consisted of *Entitlement Reform* issues (Social Security reform, Medicare reform, and Medicaid reform; $\alpha=.96$). The second factor, with loadings of .65 and greater, accounted for 20.20% and consisted of *Social Justice Issues* (healthcare reform, promoting alternative energy sources, racism/prejudice, poverty/welfare, and the separation of church and state; $\alpha=.79$). The third factor consisted of *War Concerns* (the Afghanistan and Iraq wars), accounted for 10.87% of the variance, and had loadings of .96 and greater ($r=.98, p < .001$). The fourth factor accounted for 9.61% and had loadings of .62 and greater. This factor included items related to *Conservative Concerns* (illegal immigration, abortion, gun rights, federal deficit; $\alpha=.71$). The final factor had loadings of .79 and greater and accounted for 6.62% of the variance. This factor consisted of *Economic Concerns* (the economy and unemployment; $r=.57, p < .001$). Stem cell research and the Patriot Act cross-loaded on several factors and, as a result, were not included in the factors.

Results

Descriptive and Correlation Information

As revealed by the means in Table 1, participants in this study indicated relatively high endorsement of the values and PSGC ($M_s > 3.52$). Interestingly, PSGC was positively related to equality and social justice ($r_s > .22, p_s < .05$). A greater feeling of belonging to a global community was associated with placing greater importance on equality and social justice. PSGC was also related to less endorsement of national security as a value ($r = -.20, p > .05$), as well as a more liberal political orientation and less SDO ($r_s > -.42, p_s < .001$). Political Conservatism was related to less importance placed on equality and social

justice ($r_s > -.22, p_s < .05$) and greater importance placed on wealth and national security ($r_s > .19, p_s < .05$). In general, participants appeared to be at least somewhat concerned about all of the current issues factors ($M_s > 5.12$).

To examine Hypotheses 1 through 4, independent samples *t*-test analyses were conducted to evaluate differences between participants and protestors. Supporting Hypothesis 1, participants placed greater importance on the values of national security and social order ($t_s > 2.78, p_s < .01$), as well as the power value of wealth ($t(108)=2.31, p < .05$) and the achievement value of influence ($t(108)=1.96, p = .05$). Independent *t*-test analyses were also conducted to examine Hypothesis 2. Protestors placed greater importance on the universalism values of equality and social justice, $t_s > -2.61, p_s < .01$. For the self-direction values of freedom and creativity, there were no significant differences between protestors and participants, $t_s < .64, ns$. As a result, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Protestors placed significantly more importance on values associates with the welfare and interests of others than participants. There were not significant differences, however, for values promoting independent thought and action.

Hypothesis 3 predicted PSGC to be significantly higher among protestors compared to participants. Supporting this hypothesis, protestors indicated greater PSGC ($M=6.28, SD=1.18$) than participants ($M=5.01, SD=1.63$), $t=-4.73, p < .001$. The perception of belonging to a global community consisting of all humanity was greater among protestors than participants. In addition, participants of "The Response" indicated significantly greater Political Conservatism and SDO ($M=5.67, SD=1.31; M=2.88, SD=1.30$) than protestors ($M=2.24, SD=1.08; M=1.78, SD=1.09$), $t_s > 4.89, p_s < .001$ respectively. Participants of the event were more politically conservative and indicated a greater preference for hierarchy within society. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported.

Participants and protestors were compared on the importance placed on the five factors that emerged in the factor analysis on the current issues. Participants placed greater importance on Entitlement Reform ($M=5.83, SD=1.30$) than protestors ($M=4.48, SD=1.87$), $t(108)=4.34, p < .001$. Similarly, significantly greater importance was placed on Conservative Concerns among participants ($M=5.88, SD=1.06$) than protestors ($M=4.46, SD=1.23$), $t(109)=6.45, p < .001$. In contrast, protestors placed greater importance on Social Justice Issues ($M=6.27, SD=1.18$) than participants ($M=5.26, SD=1.24$), $t(109)=-4.97, p < .001$. There was no significant difference in the importance placed on

War Concerns and Economic Concerns for participants ($M=5.55$, $SD=1.49$; $M=6.33$, $SD=.83$) and protestors ($M=5.02$, $SD=1.93$; $M=6.13$, $SD=1.19$), $t_s < 1.60$, *ns*.

Discussion

Recent social movements have highlighted the growing ideological divide and polarization that exists in the United States. “The Response” was a unique event that brought two groups with clear political and social goals into confrontation with one another. As such, this event presented an interesting and timely opportunity to examine several social-psychological theories in a real-world context characterized by a very complex intergroup situation.

Participants of the event endorsed national security and social order as important personal values more than protestors. The underlying political nature of the event and the focus of restoring the United States may highlight the focus of conservation values for those participating in the prayer rally. That is, attending and participating in the event may have been perceived as a way to focus on preserving conservative principles and attempting to “take back” the country from its current perceived path of secularism and liberalism. There was no significant difference between the two groups on values associated with the pursuit of individual thought and action. This may have been the result of both groups, although certainly from different perspectives, being open to and seeking to affect society. For participants, the focus appeared to be preserving the status quo and restoring the United States to more conservative principles. The focus for protestors, however, appeared to be promoting more progressive viewpoints and, in particular, focusing on the welfare of all people.

With a greater focus on equality and social justice, the protestors appeared to be driven by a greater concern for others. While participants of “The Response” may have been motivated to participate because of shared conservatism and religious beliefs, feelings of belonging to a global community and a greater concern for others may have driven protestors to voice opposition to the event. This greater concern for others may be apparent in the greater feelings of belonging to a global community consisting of all humanity. Feelings of belonging to a global community include the perception of being connected to others even when there is no anticipation of future contact. In other words, greater feelings of PSGC should be associated with a greater commitment and concern for all people. Not only should higher feelings of

PSGC increase concerns about the welfare of others, but it should also lead to a greater willingness to take action and participate in demonstrations and protests to counter perceived injustices. In line with this, recent research has found greater PSGC is associated with more political and social involvement (Hackett & Omoto, 2015) and greater concern with human rights (Hackett, Omoto, & Matthews, 2015). Endorsing security, power, and achievement values, which participants did significantly more than protestors, should promote a greater focus on the promotion of one’s own welfare and attainment and should decrease willingness to take action on behalf of others. Significant differences in the personal values reported to be important driving principles in people’s lives emerged between the participants and protestors.

While previous research has shown that identifying with a broader superordinate category of being human is associated with prosocial behaviors (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005), others have questioned whether people truly identify with a superordinate category in routine day-to-day social interactions (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009; Pettigrew, 1998; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). In addition, concern has been raised that identifying with a superordinate category may decrease the likelihood of social change by increasing the perception that people are interchangeable (Dovidio et al., 2009). Ultimately, this interchangeability may reduce the desire to pursue social change. The results of this study, however, may alleviate these concerns by finding that feeling part of a global community, a broad superordinate category, is strongly associated with a concern for the welfare of all people.

Participants indicated greater political conservatism than protestors. The left-right distinction in political conservatism has been characterized by two interrelated factors (Jost et al., 2003): (1) advocating versus resisting change, and (2) rejecting versus accepting inequality. Participating or protesting this controversial event may reflect the importance of these two dimensions. Protestors and participants advocated for the social change they believed important for the United States society. Protestors may have been motivated by their perception of an inherent inequality in the event’s exclusionary nature, while participants may have been driven by a desire to declare their belief in the superiority of Christian principles and ideals. This may be reflected in the greater SDO found among participants. According to SDO theorists, human societies have a tendency to organize along a social hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), where certain groups have greater access to power and privilege.

Participants of "The Response" indicated a greater tendency to preserve the hierarchical social structure and perceive certain groups as more deserving than others.

Participants and protestors of the event differed in the issues believed to be important for the United States. For participants, greater importance was placed on Entitlement Reform and Conservative Concerns. In contrast, protestors placed greater importance on Social Justice Issues. Interestingly, there were no significant differences in the importance placed on Economic Concerns and War Concerns. For both groups, concern about the struggling economy and prolonged wars are pressing issues facing the United States.

Limitations and Future Research

There are limitations that should be mentioned regarding the data and findings. Due to the nature of this study, measures consisted of a limited number of items. While this is certainly less than ideal, it was essential to keep the questionnaire to a length that participants who were engaged in social activism could complete in a short amount of time. The data are correlational and as such the causal direction between variables cannot be unambiguously determined. Another limitation occurred during recruit-

ment of participants. Data collection was intended to occur throughout the day of the event. When the research team was asked to leave the area around Reliant Stadium, however, data collection ended earlier than intended. It is not possible to ascertain definitively if the results obtained are limited to this particular event or are generalizable to other social and political events. For instance, it is possible that people who showed up early for the rally were higher on SDO or other measures than people who did not attend until after the research team was removed.

The results of this study are noteworthy and suggest several avenues for future research. Future research should continue to examine fundamental differences in guiding principles that exist between supporters and opponents of particular social, political, and religious movements. Knowledge of these differences can be used to develop intervention programs designed to address the contentious divide that exists in American politics. "The Response" provided a real-world opportunity to examine real differences between groups working for opposing social change.

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